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INTRODUCTION
DonaldJ. Bohnert was an entrepreneur who created a business
out of accepting hazardous waste for storage and disposal. The
problem, however, was that Bohnert did not possess the appropriate
permits to do this as required by Ohio's hazardous waste laws.
Indeed, Bohnert never disposed of the waste he accepted; he
transported it to rented storage lockers where it remained.1 That
is, until the local environmental agency discovered Bohnert's
activities. Imagine Bohnert's emotions as the state attorney
general's office instituted a criminal enforcement action against
him, as he pleaded guilty, and as he was convicted of 207 counts of
the illegal transportation, disposal, and storage of hazardous waste.
2
Whatever these emotions, however, imagine Bohnert's surprise on
learning that to avoid serving two years in prison, he must for five
years be a member of the Sierra Club,' a national environmental
t A.B. 1991, Washington University; J.D. Candidate 1995, University of
Pennsylvania. In memory of my father, Gerald M. Levine, who taught me to strive
for the best without sacrificing my ideals of right and wrong. With love and respect,
I dedicate this Comment to my mother, Sharon P. Levine, who has shown me how
to make my own tomorrows and to rise to each occasion, and to my sisters, Robin
and Leslie, whose constant support sustains and anchors me. I am also grateful to
my colleagues on the Law Review for their helpful comments and editorial assistance.
' Telephone Interview with J. Michael Marous, Assistant Chief and Director of
Criminal Prosecutions, Environmental Enforcement, Ohio Attorney General's Office
(Apr. 13, 1994); Telephone Interview with Michael Walton, attorney for DonaldJ.
Bohnert, Cincinnati, Ohio (Apr. 14, 1994).
2 See Ohio v. Bohnert, No. B91-2520 (C.P. Hamilton County, Ohio Nov. 6, 1991)
(court'sjudgment setting out counts of conviction). Bohnert was convicted on a total
of 219 counts, including the illegal transportation, disposal, and storage of hazardous
waste; falsification of hazardous waste manifests; illegal operation of a hazardous
waste facility; forgery; and criminal endangering. See id.
- Bohnert was sentenced to serve a total of eight years in prison. See id. Upon his
release from prison, an additional two-year prison sentence was to be suspended and
Bohnert would be placed on probation on the condition that, among other things, he
"become a member in good standing of the environmental group known as Sierra
(1841)
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advocacy organization that promotes environmental preservation
through a broad political agenda that includes lobbying and
litigating.4 Despite Bohnert's dismay at being forced to join a
group whose views he does not support and whose views are not
accepted by the mainstream of our society,5 Bohnert submits to his
required membership to avoid the alternative of prison life, the
resulting loss of liberty, and the associated stigma.
6
Bohnert has not been the only person faced with such a choice.
Recently, several judges have sentenced people convicted of
environmental crimes to serve time in the local Sierra Club.7 Such
"creative sentencing" aims to (1) promote rehabilitation of the
offender, (2) ensure public safety by placing the offender under the
continued supervision of law enforcement, and (3) minimize costs
to the community by avoiding the expense associated with incarcera-
tion.8 While creative sentences should be encouraged in light of
Club." Id.
" For a discussion of the Sierra Club's history, goals, and activities, see infra notes
237-44 and accompanying text.
s See infra notes 261-62 and accompanying text.
6 Bohnert never appealed his sentence.7 See Cruel and Unusual Punishment, INC., Apr. 1993, at 9 (describing a case in
which the owner of an electroplating company pleaded guilty to violations of state
hazardous waste laws and was placed on probation on the condition that he become
a member in good standing of the Sierra Club); Environmental Enforcement Section,
Attorney General of Ohio, Summary of Environmental Crime Convictions (Apr. 15,
1994) (on file with author) (listing four defendants other than Bohnert who were
sentenced to join the Sierra Club between 1991 and February 1994). Some courts
have also required defendants convicted of environmental violations to contribute
money to environmental and conservation groups. See Edward Felsenthal,
Environmental Sentences Upset Some Lawyers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 1993, at BI (noting
that courts in California have required defendants to make cash contributions to
environmental groups); Hunting Guide Sentenced, THE STAR-DEMOCRAT (Easton, Md.),
Aug. 27, 1993, at 5A (describing a case in which two defendants who pleaded guilty
to hunting charges were required as a condition of probation to donate $50 each to
the National Wildlife Federation, a conservation organization).
a For examples of other creative sentences and the resulting public controversy,
see Robin Abcarian, "Apology Ads" Raise Issue of Fair Play: Punishment-Citing Ethical
Questions, Some Newspapers Refuse to Publish Court-Ordered Advertisements Designed to
Embarrass Defendants, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1991, at El (describing the controversy
within the newspaper industry over how to react to creative sentences that require
offenders to take out ads exposing their crimes in local papers); Mark Curriden,
Making Punishment Fit Crime Often Not Popular, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Jan. 9, 1992,
at A3, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ATLJNL File (outlining the public
controversy over creative sentencing and giving many noteworthy examples); George
Frank, Graffiti Cleanup Is Possible Punishment, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1990, at B2,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, LAT File (reporting that county judges might soon
use a "proposed graffiti abatement program" as a form of alternative sentencing);
Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, CHI. TRIB., May 28, 1992, at 24 (editorial
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the current crisis in prison capacity,9 sentencing discretion that
allows a judge to compel membership in a political advocacy
organization has strayed too far.
Creative sentences stem from a court's statutory authority to
place a convicted criminal" on probation in lieu of incarcera-
tion." Authorizing statutes,12 however, place few restrictions on
probation and thus offer little guidance to a judge in determining
who should be granted probation, the length of the probation term,
and the particular conditions of an offender's probation.13 These
advocating creative alternatives that "send a lasting message to the offenders and stop
the behavior"); Modern Day "Scarlet Letter" Thief to Wear T-Shirt Proclaiming Her Crime,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 11, 1992, at B-14 (criticizing creative sentences that
"deliberately seek to degrade and humiliate the offender"), available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, CURNWS File.
' There are more prisoners in the United States today than at any time in our
history. The combined federal and state prison population reached a record high of
789,347 at the end of 1991. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 210 (113th ed. 1993). At
the end of 1980, the prison population numbered 315,974, less than half of the 1991
figure. See id. By 1987,46 states and the Federal Bureau of Prisons reported serious
crowding problems. See Jeff Bleich, Comment, The Politics of Prison Crowding, 77
CALIF. L. REV. 1125, 1125-26 & n.3 (1989) (citing BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OFJUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 1987, at 5 (1988)). As a result of these trends, by
January 1, 1992, 66% of the country's "jurisdictions had their.., prison.., systems
under court order or consent decree to alleviate overcrowded prison conditions."
Russell W. Gray, Note, Wilson v. Seiter: Defining the Components of and Proposing a
Direction for Eighth Amendment Prison Condition Law, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1339, 1340 &
n.6 (1992) (citing NATIONAL PRISON PROJECT, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
FOUND., STATUS REPORT: STATE PRISONS AND THE COURTS (1992)). This prison crisis
has resulted in an increased need for alternatives to traditional prison sentences. See
Nancy Blodgett, Alternative Sentencing. Overcrowded Prisons Prompt New Responses,
A.B.A.J., Nov. 1, 1987, at 32 (describing the prison overcrowding crisis and how it
has prompted criminal justice specialists to pursue alternatives to prison, including
expanded probation systems); Francis X. Clines, Prisons Run Out of Cells, Money and
Choices, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1993, at B7 (same).
10 Although corporate offenders are proper subjects of probation, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 3551(c)(1) (1988); United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 465 F.2d 58, 61 (7th Cir.
1972), this Comment will focus on the probation of individual offenders.
" "Creativity" has similarly been employed in other stages of the criminal
proceeding. For example, as part of a plea agreement, an Assistant U.S. Attorney
required 14 members of the Fourth Reich Skinheads to complete an education
program designed specifically to "enlighten and frighten" and to "confront the causes
and consequences of racism." Jim Newton, Skinheads Get Crash Course in Tolerance,
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Jan. 1, 1994, at 5A. The program, dubbed "Operation
Grow Hair," included a visit to ajail, a meeting with black U.S. DistrictJudge Terry
Hatter, a viewing of Schindler's List, and a meeting with Holocaust survivors. See id.
2 For a discussion of the statutory authority of probation, see infra notes 36-42
and accompanying text.
Is See 3 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Std. 18-2.3 cmt., at 89 (American Bar
1994] 1843
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statutes reflect the theory that because sentencing judges are often
close to the particulars of each offender's background, they should
be given discretion in granting probation and setting the terms and
conditions of probation that best rehabilitate offenders and provide
adequate public protection.
14
Common conditions of probation include the payment of a fine,
restitution to the victim of the offense, completion of a drug or
alcohol treatment program, and maintenance of a satisfactory
job.'5 Sentencing courts often attempt to make the punishment fit
the crime. As creative conditions of probation, courts have
prohibited women convicted of child abuse from becoming
pregnant,1 6 prohibited an offender convicted of pirating cable
Ass'n 1980) [hereinafter ABA SENTENCING STANDARDS] ("It has been said that
legislative limitations on probation conditions are 'conspicuously absent' .... "
(citation omitted)).
14 See id. Std. 18-2.3(d) ("The sentencing court should be authorized to individual-
ize the conditions of probation to fit the circumstances of each case."); see also HARRY
E. ALLEN ET AL., PROBATION AND PAROLE IN AMERICA 82 (1985) (noting that
.granting probation is a highly individualized process that usually focuses on the
criminal rather than the crime").
" See ABA SENTENCING STANDARDS, supra note 13, Std. 18-2.3(f). The ABA
Sentencing Standards state that probation conditions may appropriately deal with the
following matters:
(i) cooperating with a program of supervision;
(ii) meeting family responsibilities;
(iii) maintaining steady employment or engagingin a specific employment
or occupation;
(iv) pursuing prescribed educational or vocational training;
(v) undergoing available medical or psychiatric treatment, which
treatment may include periodic testing for narcotics use;
(vi) maintaining residence in a prescribed area or in a special facility
established for or available to persons on probation;
(vii) refraining from consorting with specified types of people, frequenting
specified types of places, or engaging in specified business, employ-
ment, or professional activities, to the extent that such restrictions
have a reasonable relationship with the prior offense or anticipatable
future criminal behavior;
(viii) making restitution of the fruits of the crime or reparation for
loss or damage caused thereby;
(ix) refraining from the use of alcohol or illegal drugs or the possession
of dangerous weapons; and
(x) requiring a term of community service, such as in a hospital or other
public or charitable facility.
Id.
16 See Contraceptive Implant Is Substitute forJail, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1994, at Al7
(describing how a "mildly retarded woman" convicted of child abuse avoided a jail
term by agreeing to a contraceptive implant as a condition ofprobation);Judge Orders
Birth Control for Abusive Mother, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 30, 1991, at B6 (listing reader
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television services from watching cable television, 7 required
driving under the influence offenders to participate in confronta-
tion sessions with victims of drunk driving accidents,"8 allowed
burglary victims to go into the burglars' homes and take anything
they wanted,19 and required a landlord convicted of building code
violations to live alongside his tenants."
Conditioning a probation on membership in an environmental
advocacy organization such as the Sierra Club infringes on the First
Amendment2 ' right to be free from compelled speech.22 The U.S.
Supreme Court has recognized that the First Amendment protects
the rights to "refrain from speaking"23 and to be "intellectually and
spiritually diverse or even contrary."24 By imposing an ideology as
a condition of probation, the sentencing court implicates this
fundamental First Amendment right.
It is widely recognized, however, that a condition of probation
is not improper merely because it infringes a fundamental right.
25
reactions to a probation condition that required the defendant, who was convicted
of child abuse, to use Norplant, a surgically implanted contraceptive device, for the
entire five-year probationary term in the case of People v. Johnson, No. 29,390
(Super. Ct. Tulare County, Cal. Jan. 2, 1991)). See generally Stacey L. Arthur, The
Norplant Prescription: Birth Contro Woman Contro or Crime Control?, 40 UCLA L. REV.
1 (1992). In many of these cases, however, conditions forbidding pregnancy have
been overturned on appeal. See, e.g., People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 364-66
(Ct. App. 1984) (holding that a condition of probation prohibiting defendant from
becoming pregnant was reasonably related to preventing future criminality, but
invalid because other less restrictive alternatives were available); Rodrignez v. State,
378 So. 2d 7, 8, 10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (holding invalid a probation condition
that prohibited pregnancy because the condition "add[s] nothing to decrease the
possibility of further child abuse or other criminality"); State v. Mosburg, 768 P.2d
313, 315 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that a probation condition prohibiting
defendant from becoming pregnant violated the defendant's right to privacy).
"' See Unusually CreativeJudges Now Believe SomePunishments Can Fit the Times, CHI.
TRIB., July 3, 1988, at C1.
See Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, supra note 8, at 24.
See Red, Crime Doesn't Pay-It Costs, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., July 2, 1992, at
A18, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File.
20 See Instead ofJail: "Welcome, Reptile!,"N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1988, at A22.
21 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." Id.
' See infra notes 225-53 and accompanying text (discussing the right to be free
from compelled expression).
2- Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).
24 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943).
2' See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAvE &JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 25.3, at
1994] 1845
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To promote rehabilitation while securing public safety, conditions
of probation necessarily restrict a probationer's liberty.26 Even the
most basic condition of probation, that the offender refrain from
further law-breaking activity during the probation term,27 limits the
probationer's liberty. If a probationer violates a condition of her
probation by violating a collateral law, the probationer risks greater
consequences than the nonprobationer. The probationer can be
prosecuted for the collateral crime in the same way as the non-
probationer, but in addition, the court can revoke the offender's
probation, in which case incarceration for the first conviction might
be appropriate. Nevertheless, rehabilitation of the offender, public
safety, and facilitation of law enforcement justify the imposition of
this probation condition.
Whereas probation conditions that infringe fundamental rights
are permissible because they directly relate to the purposes of
probation, probation conditions that infringe on the First Amend-
ment right to be free from compelled speech and association are
not directly related to the purposes of probation. Presumably,
education in the scope and application of environmental laws would
facilitate both rehabilitation of an offender of environmental laws
and protection of the public by giving the offender the tools to
comply with these laws in the future. Yet the Sierra Club's agenda
includes changing the current scope and implementation of
environmental laws.2" Imposing such an ideology on a probationer
is unnecessary to rehabilitate the offender and assure future
compliance with the law.
Moreover, the exercise of First Amendment liberty interests is
essential to the successful rehabilitation of a probationer. Histori-
146-52 (1984 & Supp. 1991); 2 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 529, at 146-57 (1982 & Supp. 1993); see also infra notes 105-16 and
accompanying text.26 See Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 1980) ("The fact that
conditions restrict [the probationer's] freedom is not dispositive-virtually all
probation conditions are restrictive."); see also United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez,
521 F.2d 259, 266 (9th Cir. 1975) ("It is our belief that reasonable restraints on
probationers are necessary to promote the use of probation as an alternative to
incarceration."); ABA SENTENCING STANDARDS, supra note 13, Std. 18-2.3 cmt., at 87
("Inherently, probation conditions involve the regulation of liberty .... ").
2 Under the federal Sentencing Reform Act, which governs crimes committed
after November 1, 1987, the requirement that all federal offenders not commit
another federal, state, or local crime during the period of probation is a mandatory
condition of probation. See 18 U.S.C. § 35 6 3 (a)(1) (1988).
28 For a discussion of the Sierra Club's history, goals, and activities, see infra notes
237-44, 262 and accompanying text.
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cally, First Amendment rights have been accorded "preferred
status"2" for several reasons. First, freedom of expression guaran-
tees that the marketplace of ideas will ultimately reveal the truth."
Second, free speech is essential to "intelligent self-government in a
democratic system.""1 Most important for the purposes of proba-
tion, freedom of expression promotes self-fulfillment, autonomy,
and human dignity.3 2 Respect for the structure of society begins
with self-respect, and a probationer who is unnecessarily deprived
of the chance to develop a sense of autonomy, and a sense of
dignity for self and human life will be unable to transform those
values into respect for society's legal order."3 Furthermore, the
probationer will perceive the unnecessary deprivation of her rights
as indicative of the unfairness of the legal system; in turn, the
29 GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1105-17 (10th ed. 1980); see also NEIL
P. COHEN &JAMES J. GOBERT, THE LAW OF PROBATION AND PAROLE § 5.10, at 213
(1983 & Supp. 1993) (noting that, in general, conditions of probation infringing on
First Amendment rights are evaluated especially critically because of the preferred
nature of these rights).
" See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting):
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they
may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of
their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free
trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only
ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.
Id. at 630. For criticism of the marketplace of ideas theory, see C. Edwin Baker, Scope
of First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 974 (1978) ("The
assumptions on which the classic marketplace of ideas theory rests are almost
universally rejected today. Because of this failure of assumptions, the hope that the
marketplace leads to truth, or even to the best or most desirable decision, becomes
implausible."); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984
DUKE L.J. 1, 4-5 (arguing that the marketplace of ideas often justifies government
intervention and regulation of expression).
s1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-1, at 786 (2d ed.
1988) (ascribing this theory to Alexander Meiklejohn). For criticism of the intelligent
self-government theory, see Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 591, 601 (1982) (arguing that this theory of the First Amendment is too narrow,
and that "[i]ndeed, political democracy is merely a means to-or, in another sense, a
logical outgrowth of-the much broader [First Amendment] value of individual self-
realization").
2 See David Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the
First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 62 (1974) ("The value of free expression...
rests on its deep relation to self-respect arising from autonomous self-determination
without which the life of the spirit is meager and slavish."). For criticism of this
theory, see Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1, 25 (1971).
3 See infra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
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probationer will be less inclined to respect and abide by society's
legal structure in the future.
The recent proliferation of probation conditions that require an
offender to associate with a particular ideology3 compels an
examination into the doctrines currently employed by courts
reviewing probation conditions that infringe fundamental rights.
While the Supreme Court has failed to articulate any standard by
which such conditions should be measured, lower courts have been
forced to develop their own doctrines to address this issue. Without
coherent guidance, however, courts have defined several different
standards, none of which have been applied with any certainty or
regularity.8 5 As sentencing judges continue to respond to the
mounting prison crisis, the practice of alternative sentencing
becomes more frequent, and as a result this lack of clear guidance
becomes increasingly significant in affecting fundamental rights.
Part I of this Comment reviews the history, underlying authority,
and conditions of probation in general. The basic standard of
review applied to probation conditions is then construed. Part II
surveys conditions of probation that restrict a probationer from
engaging in constitutionally protected activity and the limits on
imposing such conditions. This Part reveals the current lack of
coherence among and within jurisdictions and the resulting
inadequate protection accorded fundamental First Amendment
rights.
Part III of this Comment analyzes conditions that infringe a
probationer's First Amendment right to be free from compelled
expression. This Part reveals that such probation conditions are
only indirectly related to the purposes of probation, and that they
in fact deprive the probationer of the opportunity for meaningful
rehabilitation because they deny the probationer the right to
develop self-respect, autonomy, and human dignity. This Part then
proposes that probation conditions that impose an ideology merit
a heightened constitutional scrutiny. Only when there are no less
" See infra notes 191-213 and accompanying text.
35 For one commentator's explanation for this phenomenon, see Heinz R. Hink,
The Application of Constitutional Standards of Protection to Probation, 29 U. CHI. L. REV.
483, 484 (1962) ("The wide range of trial court discretion in matters of... probation
... has found appellate courts highly unwilling to establish definite criteria for the
use of trialjudges."). For a discussion of the reasonableness standard, the balancing
standard, and the least restrictive alternative standard, see infra notes 117-70 and
accompanying text.
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restrictive alternatives should an offender's probation be condi-
tioned on an affirmative requirement that compels expression.
I. PROBATION AND CONDITIONS IN GENERAL
A. Authority and Purposes of Probation
The power to grant probation is purely statutory.3 6 Both
federal3 7 and state38 jurisdictions have enacted statutes authorizing
probation. Under the Federal Probation Act, 9 in force for crimes
committed prior to November 1, 1987, probation is authorized upon
suspension of a sentence.4" The court is authorized to condition
probation "upon such terms and conditions as the court deems
best."4" The Act expressly provides as conditions of probation the
payment of a fine, restitution to aggrieved parties, and support for
legal dependents.4 2
' Courts have no inherent power to grant probation. See Exparte United States,
242 U.S. 27, 52 (1916) (concluding that "recourse must be had to Congress whose
legislative power on the subject is in the very nature of things adequately complete");
see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(e) ("After conviction of an offense not punishable by
death or by life imprisonment, the defendant may be placed on probation if
permitted by law."). In response to Ex parte United States, Congress enacted the
Federal Probation Act in 1925. See Act of Mar. 4, 1925, ch. 521, 43 Stat. 1259, 1259-
61 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651-3656 (1988) (repealed Nov. 1, 1987)).
37 See Sentencing Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559,3561-3566,3571-3574,3581-3586 (1988), and
28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988) (effective Nov. 1, 1987)). For crimes committed prior
to November 1, 1987, the Federal Probation Act, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651-3656,
authorizes probation.
38 See COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 29, § 5.03 (listing state statutes that authorize
probation); Arthur, supra note 16, at 29 n.166 (same); Jeffrey C. Filcik, Recent
Development, Signs of the Times: Scarlet Letter Probation Conditions, 37 WASH. U. J.
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 291, 294 n.11 (1990) (same).
"' Act of Mar. 4, 1925, ch. 521, 43 Stat. 1259, 1259-61 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 3651-3656 (1988) (repealed Nov. 1, 1987)).
4' See id. § 3651. The relevant portions of the statute state:
Upon entering ajudgment of conviction of any offense not punishable by
death or life imprisonment, any court having jurisdiction to try offenses
against the United States when satisfied that the ends ofjustice and the best
interest of the public as well as the defendant will be served thereby, may
suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant
on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as the
court deems best.
Id.
41 Id.
42 See id.
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Courts have further relied on the permissive language in the
Federal Probation Act to impose a wide variety of conditions on
probation that are not expressly provided in the Act.4" These
discretionary conditions include, for example, a requirement that
the probationer abide by all applicable laws,44 a requirement that
the offender not associate with any known homosexuals, 45 a
requirement that the offender register with the Selective Service,
46
and a requirement that the offender not associate with any Irish
Catholic organizations. 41 Courts have also imposed a variety of
discretionary probation conditions under state probation statutes.
48
The primary purpose of probation is rehabilitation. 49 Proba-
41 See United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 147 (5th Cir. 1979) (finding the
Federal Probation Act's list of probation conditions not to be exclusive); see also Mary
Lou Howard, Note, Charitable Contributions as a Condition of Federal Probation for
Corporate Defendants: A Controversial Sanction UnderNew Law, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
530, 533-38 (1985) (outlining the debate over whether the Federal Probation Act's
explicit list of conditions of probation is exemplary and therefore authorizes the
sanction of charitable contributions to be given to nonaggrieved parties).
44 See, e.g., ADVISORY COMM. ON SENTENCING & REVIEW, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N,
PROBATION § 3.2(a) (1970), reprinted in STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION
OF CRIMINALJUSTICE 398 (American Bar Ass'n 1974) [hereinafter ABA PROBATION
STANDARDS] (recommending that "[it should be a condition of every sentence to
probation that the probationer lead a law-abiding life during the period of his
probation"); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a)(1) (1988) (Sentencing Reform Act)
(governing crimes committed after November 1, 1987 and requiring that all federal
offenders not commit another federal, state, or local crime during the period of
probation).
4s See United States v. Kohlberg, 472 F.2d 1189, 1190 (9th Cir. 1973) (upholding
such a condition of probation for an offender who was convicted of mailing obscene
matter).
4 See United States v. Alarik, 439 F.2d 1349, 1351 (8th Cir. 1971) (upholding such
a condition of probation for an offender convicted of refusal to register for the draft).
41 See Malone v. United States, 502 F.2d 554, 556-57 (9th Cir. 1974) (upholding
conditions of probation that prohibited the offender, convicted of unlawful
exportation of firearms from the United States to the United Kingdom, from
associating with any Irish Catholic organizations or the American Irish Republican
movement, and from visiting any Irish pubs), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1124 (1975).
4' Discretionary conditions approved of under various state probation statutes
include a requirement that a convicted purse snatcher wear metal taps on his shoes,
see People v. McDowell, 130 Cal. Rptr. 839, 842-44 (Ct. App. 1976), a requirement
that a probationer convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol affix a bumper
sticker to that effect on his automobile, see Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So. 2d 123, 125-
26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986), and a requirement that a probationer convicted of
sexual abuse be required to post warning signs on his home and on his automobile
reading "Dangerous Sex Offender," see State v. Bateman, 771 P.2d 314, 315, 319 (Or.
Ct. App. 1989).
" See Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264 (1943). In Roberts, the Supreme
Court noted that the purpose of probation was
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tion is an opportunity for the offender to reform without the stigma
or the corruptive influences of incarceration." These factors are
particularly appropriate in cases of white-collar crime, where the
perpetrator is usually found to be an otherwise productive member
of society. Furthermore, practical considerations such as prison
to provide an individualized program offering a young or unhardened
offender an opportunity to rehabilitate himself without institutional
confinement under the tutelage of a probation official and under the
continuing power of the court to impose institutional punishment for his
original offense in the event that he abuse this opportunity.
Id. at 272; see also Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 1980) ("The
primary purpose of probation is to rehabilitate the offender."); Porth v. Templar, 453
F.2d 330, 333 (10th Cir. 1971) ("This court has said that the purpose of probation is
to 'give the convicted person an opportunity to mend his way and to so have his
freedom under conditions ... .'" (quoting Thomas v. United States, 327 F.2d 795,
797 (10th Cir. 1964))). Courts generally recognize protection of the public as the
other fundamental purpose of probation. See, e.g., United States v. Terrigno, 838 F.2d
371,374 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that the "twin goals of probation" are "rehabilitation
and protection of the public"); Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362, 1366-67 (11th Cir.
1982) (noting that the "two essential purposes of probation... are the rehabilitation
of the probationer, and the protection of society").
" See United States v. Murray, 275 U.S. 347, 357 (1928) (noting that probation
works so that the "stigma might be withheld and an opportunity for reform and
repentance be granted before actual imprisonment should stain the life of the
convict"); see also ABA PROBATION STANDARDS, supra note 44, § 1.2, at 394. The ABA
Probation Standards list the following reasons why probation is desirable:
(i) it maximizes the liberty of the individual while at the same time
vindicating the authority of the law and effectively protecting the public
from further violations of law;
(ii) it affirmatively promotes the rehabilitation of the offender by continu-
ing normal community contacts;
(iii) it avoids the negative and frequently stultifying effects of confinement
which often severely and unnecessarily complicate the reintegration of
the offender into the community;
(iv) it greatly reduces the financial cost to the public treasury of an effective
correctional system;
(v) it minimizes the impact of the conviction upon innocent dependents of
the offender.
Id.; see also EDGARDO ROTMAN, BEYOND PUNISHMENT: A NEW VIEW ON THE
REHABILITATION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS 154 (1990) (noting that probation avoids
the "desocializing effects of imprisonment and allow[s] the use of the existing
community resources to make the offender better able to lead a law-abiding life").
" SeeJames C. Weissman, Constitutional Primer on Modem Probation Conditions, 8
NEW EN.J. PRISON L. 367,370 (1982) ("Public interest in punishing effectively these
[white-collar] non-traditional criminals has stimulated creative sentencing practices."
(footnote omitted)); see also ROTMAN, supra note 50, at 13 (noting that although they
might at first seem outside the scope of meaningful rehabilitative efforts, socially well-
adjusted white-collar and regulatory offenders are appropriate candidates for
rehabilitation).
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overcrowding and the economic burdens of incarceration support
placing offenders on probation.
5 2
Our system of trial and sentencing requires that trial judges
maintain broad discretion in determining conditions of probation
and setting terms of probation. The trial judge is uniquely situated
to learn about each defendant and the crime of which she is
convicted." To serve sufficiently the purposes of probation, the
trial judge must be equipped with the power to craft a term of
probation that is most likely to effect the probationer's rehabilita-
tion.
Early theories characterized probation as a privilege, not a right.
The "act of grace" theory suggested that probation conditions were
unreviewable because the offender did not have a substantive right
to probation.5 4 The offender could either accept the probation
conditions as granted, or chose the alternative, incarceration.55
52 See ABA SENTENCING STANDARDS, supra note 13, Std. 18-2.3 cmt., at 77 (noting
that "probation costs about one-fourteenth as much as imprisonment"); HOWARD
ABADINSKY, PROBATION AND PAROLE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 391 (1977) ("The cost
of incarceration and the current overcrowding in most prison systems would appear
to limit the viability of the increased use of imprisonment.... ."); ALLEN ET AL., supra
note 14, at 264 (highlighting several reasons why probation is a relatively cost
effective alternative to imprisonment); ROTMAN,supra note 50, at 161 (noting that the
increasing overcrowding of prisons is a "strong pragmatic motivation for favoring...
noncustodial sanctions"); Arthur, supra note 16, at 31 (questioning whether probation
has "simply become a practical necessity").
The crisis of overcrowding in prisons has caused many penal systems to
implement rudimentary alternatives to traditional prisons. For example, Arizona
shifted drunk driver incarcerations to tents to house more serious offenders in cells.
See Clines, supra note 9, at B7. For statistics on the scope of the prison crisis, see
supra note 9.
" See United States v. Stine, 675 F.2d 69, 71-72 (3d Cir.) (noting that trial judges
have the "front-line responsibility for accommodating the needs of society with the
needs of convicted offenders," and that the appellate court's review of probation
conditions is limited "because it cannot replicate the trial judge's superior vantage
point"), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1110 (1982).
11 See Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492-93 (1935) ("Probation or suspension of
sentence comes as an act of grace to one convicted of a crime, and may be coupled
with such conditions in respect of its duration as Congress may impose."); United
States v. Kohlberg, 472 F.2d 1189, 1190 (9th Cir. 1973) (relying on the premise that
probation is an act of grace); Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So. 2d 123, 125 n.2 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1986) ("[P]robation generally is but a matter of grace."); see also Note,
Judicial Review of Probation Conditions, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 181, 188-91 (1967)
(discussing how the "act of grace" theory was an early obstacle to the review of
probation conditions). But see ROTMAN, supra note 50, at 11-13 (advocating that due
process encompasses a concept of a constitutional right to rehabilitation).
" Even today, when it is generally recognized that probationers have a right to
review of probation conditions, the conditions are rarely litigated. This is due in part
to the fact that most offenders are "delighted to receive probation" in light of the
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Although in 1973 the Supreme Court disavowed the "act of grace"
theory, 6 lower courts continue to pay it homage.1
7
The "contract theory" of probation characterized probation as
a contractual relationship in which the court agrees to release the
offender, and the offender, in return, agrees to abide by the
probation conditions imposed by the court.5 The offender thereby
waives any objections to the probation conditions by agreeing to
accept a suspended sentence from the court. Many courts refuse to
rely on this contract theory of probation59 because the probationer's
bargaining power in any such contract negotiation is wholly
deceptive considering that the probationer's alternative is incarcera-
tion.60
alternative of incarceration. COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 29, § 5.08, at 207-08.
Similarly, lack of desire or resources on the part of the probationer to object to
probation conditions has frustrated other interested parties or family members, who
cannot challenge the probation conditions of third parties. See West v. Paige, 835 F.
Supp. 20,21 (D. Me. 1993) ("[T]he right to seek reliefbelongs to [the defendant], not
to the plaintiff. The fact that the plaintiff has a close relationship with [the
defendant] as the mother of his child and as his fiancee does not give her any right
to challenge the probation conditions imposed upon him and his activities.").
'6 See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 n.4 (1973) ("It is clear ... that a
probationer can no longer be denied due process [on the grounds that]... probation
is an 'act of grace.'").
57 See Bruce D. Greenberg, Probation Conditions and the First Amendment: When
Reasonableness Is Not Enough, 17 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 45, 56 (1981) ("But
though the doctrine is 'thoroughly discredited,' courts continue ritualistically to
mouth it." (footnote omitted)). But see United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 148 (5th
Cir. 1979) (refusing to rely on the act of grace theory of probation); ABA PROBATION
STANDARDS, supra note 44, at 385-86 (noting that "probation is a good bit more than
the 'matter of grace' or 'leniency' which characterizes the philosophy of the general
public and of many judges and legislatures on the subject").
' See Note, supra note 54, at 191-93 (discussing probation as a contract); see also
Greenberg, supra note 57, at 57-60 (same).
" See Tonry, 605 F.2d at 148 (refusing to rely on the contract theory of probation);
United States v. Consuelo-Conzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 n.15 (9th Cir. 1975) (rejecting
the contract theory of probation); People v. Hackler, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 681,683-84 (Ct.
App. 1993) (rejecting the contention that the defendant's agreement to the probation
condition in the trial court bars his attack on appeal).
' See United States v. Mitsubishi Int'l Corp., 677 F.2d 785, 788 (9th Cir. 1982) ("A
defendant generally may reject probation and elect to have sentence imposed. For
the individual defendant who must accept arguably impermissible conditions of
probation or suffer incarceration, this choice is illusory." (citations omitted)); United
States v. Pierce, 561 F.2d 735, 739 (9th Cir. 1977) ("As a practical matter, a
defendant's consent to a probation condition is likely to be nominal where consent
is given only to avoid imprisonment."), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978); Consuelo-
Gonzalez, 521 F.2d at 274 (Wright, J., dissenting) ("Consent by the defendant,
however, is more likely to be nominal than real. A convicted defendant will often
accept almost any alternative to imprisonment....").
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In 1984, Congress disavowed these theories of probation when,
in the federal Sentencing Reform Act ("SRA"), 6" it provided that
probation constitutes a sentence in itself.6 2 The SRA states that the
purposes of sentencing are just punishment, deterrence, incapacita-
tion for public protection, and rehabilitation.6" The SRA also
includes a widely expanded list of conditions of probation' and
clearly indicates that the list is exemplary, not exclusive.
65
B. Standard of Review: Parameters of Probation
Conditions Generally
The key elements of probation are the conditions it imposes,
which allow the courts to simultaneously provide particularized
treatment to the offender and protection to the surrounding
community.66 Under the Federal Probation Act, the SRA, and
state authorizing statutes, a sentencing court has broad discretion
in determining conditions of probation. 67 But because probation
61 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559, 3561-3566, 3571-3574, 3581-3586 (1988); 28 U.S.C.
§§ 991-998 (1988).
62 See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3251.
63 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2); see also Weissman, supra note 51, at 367-68 ("Modern
rehabilitative philosophy, or the 'rehabilitative ideal,' is being discarded in favor of
determinate sentencing values advocating retribution and equality." (footnote
omitted)).
"See 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a) (listing mandatory conditions of probation, including
that the defendant not commit another federal, state, or local crime during the
probation term); id. § 3563(b) (listing examples of discretionary conditions of
probation, including, among others, fines, restitution, community service, and
psychiatric counseling).
See § 3563(b)(21) (allowing "other conditions as the court may impose"); see also
S. REP. No. 225, supra note 62, at 96 ("The list is not exhaustive, and it is not
intended at all to limit the court's options-conditions of a nature very similar to, or
very different from, those set forth may also be imposed.").
' See Note, supra note 54, at 181 ("The essence of probation is the condition-a
judicially imposed restriction upon the convict's actions after release."); see also ABA
PROBATION STANDARDS, supra note 44, at 389 (noting that the recommendations on
probation conditions are based on the philosophy that "conditions should be
individualized for the particular offender"); id. § 3.2(b), at 398 ("Conditions imposed
by the court should be designed to assist the probationer in leading a law-abiding
life.").
67 In interpreting the first Federal Probation Act, the U.S. Supreme Court noted
that:
To accomplish the purpose of the statute, an exceptional degree of
flexibility in administration is essential. It is necessary to individualize each
case, to give that careful, humane and comprehensive consideration to the
particular situation of each offender which would be possible only in the
exercise of a broad discretion.
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is either an alternative to the imposition of a sentence or a sentence
itself, conditions of probation must serve the purposes of the
criminal law.
68
The basic test of validity for probation conditions was set forth
in Porth v. Templar.69  The defendant in Porth was convicted of
failure to file tax returns, but the court placed the defendant on
probation after suspending imposition of the sentence. As a
condition of probation, the defendant was prohibited from
speaking, writing, and distributing information questioning the
constitutionality of the federal reserve system and the federal
income tax laws.7" In upholding the probation condition to the
extent that it prohibited public speeches designed to incite others
to violate the law,71 the court held that "[t]he only limitation is that
the conditions have a reasonable relationship to the treatment of
the accused and the protection of the public."
72
This "reasonable relationship" test 7 has been further interpret-
Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932); see also ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAW
OF SENTENCINC § 5.4, at 114 (2d ed. 1991 & Supp. 1993) ("Perhaps the greatest
restriction on permissible probation conditions is limited imagination.").
' See United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 148 (5th Cir. 1979) ("The judge may,
in fact is obliged to, view probation as a substitute for imprisonment and formulate
conditions calculated to ensure that the probation furthers the purposes of the
criminal law."); see also Arthur, supra note 16, at 37 ("The hallmark of a valid
probation condition ... is its ability, by means of coercion, deterrence, or
enlightenment, to make future crime less likely. When a condition successfully
thwarts future crime, the multiple purposes of rehabilitation, public protection, and
facilitation of law enforcement are served.").
69 453 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1971).
70 See id. at 332 n.1.
7' Although the court upheld the probation condition to the extent that it
prohibited public speeches designed to incite others to violate the law, the court
invalidated the condition to the extent it was overbroad. Its overbreadth resulted
from the prohibition on the expression of opinions as to the validity of the tax laws.
See id. at 334; see also infra notes 149-70 (discussing the least restrictive alternative
standard).
7 Porth, 453 F.2d at 333.
s This test has been adopted by many jurisdictions. See, e.g., United States v.
Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that "the only
permissible conditions are those that ... can reasonably be said to contribute
significantly both to the rehabilitation of the convicted person and to the protection
of the public"); Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So. 2d 123, 125 n.3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1986) (holding that "the condition should bear some relationship to the nature of the
offense of conviction and should have some reasonable rehabilitative basis").
California has adopted a variation on this reasonable relationship test that
concludes that a probation condition is invalid if: (1) there is no relationship between
the condition and the crime of which the offender was convicted; (2) the condition
relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal; and (3) the condition requires or
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ed in Higdon v. United States 4 to require a two-step inquiry. First,
a reviewing court must determine that the sentencing court imposed
the conditions for permissible purposes.75 The Higdon court found
that the only permissible purposes of probation are the "appropri-
ateness and attainability for rehabilitation and the need to protect
the public."76 Second, the conditions must be reasonably related
to these purposes.
77
In Higdon, the defendant was convicted of defrauding the
government through an elaborate overpayment and kickback
scheme. As a condition of probation, the defendant was required
to forfeit all assets, including his home, and to work full-time for
charity for three years without pay."8 The Ninth Circuit reviewed
these special conditions of probation after the defendant failed to
satisfy the charitable work requirement and the district court
revoked probation. The court held that the special conditions were
impermissible because "they were not reasonably related to
rehabilitation of the offender or protection of the public."79 The
court found that the conditions of probation actually frustrated the
rehabilitative purposes of probation, since their "cumulative impact"
was so great that they caused Higdon "to falter and to resort to
deception."80 The court suggested, however, that imposition of
one or the other special condition of probation might have been
forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality. See People v.
Lent, 541 P.2d 545, 548 (Cal. 1975); People v. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290, 293 (Ct.
App. 1967); see also Thomas E. Bartrum, Note, Birth Control as a Condition of
Probation-A New Weapon in the War Against Child Abuse, 80 KY. L.J. 1037, 1040 (1992)
(describing the "reasonably related" standard employed by California courts). See
generally Greenberg, supra note 57, at 63-77 (further defining reasonable relation tests,
as used by differentjurisdictions, as facial reasonableness and analytical reasonable-
ness).
71 627 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1980).
7- See id. at 897.
76 Id. The Higdon court found that punishment and circumvention of statutory
sentencing limits were impermissible purposes of probation. See id. at 898.
7 See id. at 897.
78 See id. at 896.
71 Id. at 898. This is the reason that the court explicitly stated for finding the
conditions impermissible; however, the court essentially employed a least restrictive
alternative analysis in reaching its conclusion. For a discussion of the least restrictive
alternative test, see infra notes 149-70 and accompanying text.
80 Higdon, 627 F.2d at 899-900. When Higdon's probation was revoked, he had
served all but eight months of his probation term. See id. at 901 n.18. Throughout
the probation term, Higdon's circumstances deteriorated greatly. He worked two full-
time jobs to satisfy his probation and support his family; his wife left him; and he
developed poor health and a drinking problem. See id. at 896.
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permissible. 1
Although a sentencing court's discretion is broad, it has been
generally agreed that a court's discretion in fixing conditions of
probation is further limited by basic standards of criminal law. For
instance, a court cannot inflict restrictions as conditions of
probation that are improper penal sanctions or that are reserved for
application in only a circumscribed class of cases.82 Similarly, a
court cannot impose restrictions on a probationer as conditions of
probation that have been found to be improper conditions of
imprisonment or parole." Finally, a court cannot impose conditions
of probation that are "impossible or extremely difficult to satis-
fy" 84 or those that are too vague as to sufficiently guide the
probationer.
8 5
II. PROBATION CONDITIONS THAT INFRINGE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
A. Constitutional Rights of Probationers
The Supreme Court in Griffin v. Wisconsin"6 recognized that a
probationer has a reduced liberty interest. The Court found that
probationers have "conditional liberty," depending on special
probation restrictions." Yet probationers retain a higher degree
of liberty than their counterparts who are incarcerated. 8 This
81 See id. at 899-900. The court suggested that thejudge could have imposed a set
of conditions "intended to restore Higdon's self-esteem, integrate him into a working
environment, and inculcate in him a sense of social responsibility without driving him
into penury and deceit." Id. at 900.
' See Note, supra note 54, at 197-98 (describing this limit on judicial discretion as
a unconstitutional limitation).
' See United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1975) ("[I]t
is virtually certain that those restraints that have been held improper when placed on
prisoners and parolees will also be unsuitable as probation conditions.").
' COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 29, § 5.08, at 209; see also Sweeney v. United
States, 353 F.2d 10, 11 (7th Cir. 1965) (finding that a probation condition requiring
a chronic alcoholic to refrain from drinking was unreasonable if the probationer
could prove that his alcoholism destroyed his ability to abstain).
" See People v. McDowell, 130 Cal. Rptr. 839, 843 (Ct. App. 1976) (finding that
the wording of the condition as imposed was "not sufficiently precise").
483 U.S. 868 (1987).87 d. at 874 ("To a greater or lesser degree, it is always true of probationers...
that they do not enjoy 'the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only
... conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special [probation]
restrictions.'" (citation omitted)).
" As noted by one writer:
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phenomenon has sparked a debate over the extent to which
probationers should be accorded constitutional rights. 9
Many probation conditions implicate constitutional rights in
their mission to promote the rehabilitation of the probationer and
the protection of the public. Conditions of probation might
prohibit the probationer from actively participating in demonstra-
tions that advocate lawlessness, 90 prohibit the probationer from
associating with a certain organization, 91 or prohibit the probation-
er convicted of a crime relating to a public or labor union position
from becoming involved in political 2 or union activities.9" Simi-
larly, to facilitate law enforcement, a court might impose a condi-
tion of probation that requires the probationer to submit to lie
detector tests, 94 psychological counseling, 95 or disclosure require-
Probationers and parolees walk an interesting line. They dwell among the
public with whom they share many of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights,
but they remain subject to the strictures of the criminal justice system.
Although convicts on probation or parole are not entitled to the same
degree of freedom as ordinary citizens, they do retain a broader range of
protected liberty interests than persons who are incarcerated.
Arthur, supra note 16, at 60 (footnote omitted).
" For a discussion of the various standards currently employed to determine the
extent to which probationers should be accorded constitutional rights, see infra notes
117-70 and accompanying text.
o See In re Mannino, 92 Cal. Rptr. 880, 886-89 (Ct. App. 1971) (upholding
conditions of probation to the extent they prohibited the probationer's active
participation in demonstrations), overruled on other grounds, 851 P.2d 802 (Cal. 1993).
"' See United States v. Schiff, 876 F.2d 272, 276-77 (2d Cir. 1989) (upholding
probation condition that prohibited probationer convicted of attempted tax evasion
and failure to file a tax return from associating with any group that advocates the
violation of tax laws); United States v. Lawson, 670 F.2d 923, 929-30 (10th Cir. 1982)
(upholding probation condition that required probationer convicted of failure to file
income tax returns and supplying false withholding information to disassociate
himself from any organization that had the purpose of defeating the tax laws); United
States v. Kohlberg, 472 F.2d 1189, 1190 (9th Cir. 1973) (upholding a condition of
probation that prohibited association with any known homosexuals by an offender
who was convicted of mailing obscene matter).
' See United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 150-51 (5th Cir. 1979) (affirming
district court's decision that probation condition prohibiting offender of Federal
Election Campaign Act from running for political office and from engaging in any
political activity that was related to campaigning for political office was valid).
" See United States v. Hughes, 964 F.2d 536, 542 (6th Cir. 1992) (upholding
condition prohibiting probationer convicted of crimes related to union position from
exercising any decision-making authority over union-financed political action
committee), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1254 (1993); United States v. Beros, 833 F.2d 455,
467 (3d Cir. 1987) (upholding condition that prohibited probationer convicted of
embezzling union funds from holding union position, being employed by any union,
representing any union, and receiving any union funds).
' See People v. Miller, 256 Cal. Rptr. 587, 588-89 (Ct. App. 1989) (upholding
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ments"6 that might be subject to Fifth Amendment analysis, 97 or
to warrantless searches98 that might be subject to Fourth Amend-
ment analysis. 9
Although the probationer might have conditional liberty
interests, these interests are not absolutely limited or reduced. It
has been recognized that rehabilitation cannot successfully occur
unless there is real change within the offender."' The first step
in the rehabilitative process is to develop self-respect and an
appreciation for human dignity. Development of these values is a
necessary precondition to respecting and abiding by society's values,
represented by its laws. 1 To effectuate these goals, probationers
should be guaranteed all fundamental rights except those whose
infringement is absolutely necessary to protect the public.1
0 2
condition that required probationer to submit to polygraph examinations at the
direction of his probation officer).
" See United States v. Stine, 675 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1982) (affirming the district
court's decision that a probation condition requiring psychological counseling was
valid).
' See United States v. Pierce, 561 F.2d 735, 742 (9th Cir. 1977) (affirming
revocation of probation when probationer, convicted of concealing property subject
to tax assessment, refused to comply with condition that required financial
disclosure), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978).917 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing in relevant part that no person "shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself").
" See United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 263 (9th Cir. 1975)
(approving a probation condition that required probationer to submit to a "search of
her person or property conducted in a reasonable manner and at a reasonable time
by a probation officer").
9 The Fourth Amendment provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
1o0 See, e.g., ROTMAN, supra note 50, at 8 ("Significant change will come only from
the individual's own insight, which alone can dissolve the antisocial influences that
conditioned his or her mind.").
101 Rotman notes that rehabilitation "seeks to awaken in [offenders] a deep
awareness of their relationship with the rest of society, resulting in a genuine sense
of social responsibility." Id. at 77.
102 See ABA SENTENCING STANDARDS, supra note 13, Std. 18-2.3 cmt., at 97
(explaining that the standards recommend according "the probationer those
fundamental rights whose recognition would not clearly impede the objectives of
probation"); Melissa Burke, Note, The Constitutionality of the Use of the Norplant
Contraceptive Device as a Condition of Probation, 20 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 207, 226
(1992) (noting that "many have urged that given the rehabilitative goals of probation,
constitutional interests should be protected to the greatest extent possible").
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"[R]ecognition of the [offender] as a possessor of rights has a
secondary rehabilitative effect... [of] increas[ing her] feelings of
dignity and self-worth.""0 3 There is no better way to ensure that
probation meets its goals of rehabilitation and protecting the public
than to provide this opportunity for the offender to become a law-
abiding member of society.
10 4
B. Today's Standard of Review: No Coherent Doctrine
1. Probation Conditions that Implicate Fundamental Rights
Are Not Summarily Dismissed as Unconstitutional
It is generally accepted that a condition of probation is not
"necessarily invalid simply because it affects a probationer's ability
to exercise constitutionally protected rights." l0 ' Indeed, many
courts refuse to rely on the Eighth Amendment to limit probation
conditions, on the theory that probation does not constitute
punishment and that the amendment applies only to punish-
ment.10 6  The other constitutional provisions, however, are not
limited to punishment, and while a probationer is generally not
accorded the same constitutional protections as non-
probationers,' 7 the Constitution defines the permissible bound-
103 ROTMAN, supra note 50, at 87. Rotman also maintains that granting a
probationer the legal status as one with rights generates "trust in the legal system, and
favors the possibility of self-command and responsible action within society." Id. at
77.
204 See DAVID DRESSLER, PRACTICE AND THEORY OF PROBATION AND PAROLE 124
(1959) ("But the most effective community protection is that which results from
change within the offender, so that he no longer wants to aggress against society.").
105 United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 150 (5th Cir. 1979).
'o See, e.g., Springer v. United States, 148 F.2d 411, 415 (9th Cir. 1945)
("[C]onditions of probation are not punitive in character and the question of whether
or not the terms are cruel and unusual and thus violative of the Constitution of the
United States does not arise for the reason that the Constitution applies only to
punishment."); Burke, supra note 102, at 240 (noting that because it is not offered as
a form of punishment, a "court may well view a probation condition that is part of
a rehabilitative plan as immune to an Eighth Amendment challenge"). But see Hink,
supra note 35, at 489 ("If the court admits that probation is intended to substitute a
milder form of retribution for the original punishment, how can it follow that
probation must not meet at least the same degree of constitutional limitation against
cruel and unusual terms?"); Jon A. Brilliant, Note, The Modern Day Scarlet Letter: A
Critical Analysis of Modern Probation Conditions, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1357, 1377, 1381-84
(advocating that because many probation conditions indeed constitute punishment,
courts should subject them to Eighth Amendment scrutiny).
1' See Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330, 334 (10th Cir. 1971) ("This is not to say
that one on probation has the rights of citizens who are not on probation.").
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aries of probation conditions.
Courts generally subject probation conditions that restrict
constitutional rights to "special scrutiny." 8 Thus, when constitu-
tional liberties are implicated, the condition of probation is subject
to a second level of scrutiny'0 9 beyond the basic "reasonable
relationship" test outlined in Porth. In United States v. Consuelo-
Gonzalez,'10 the Ninth Circuit set forth the test to determine
whether a condition of probation impermissibly infringes a
constitutional right.'' The probationer in Consuelo-Gonzalez,
convicted of heroin smuggling, was required as a condition of
probation to submit to warrantless searches by any law enforcement
agent. The court held that the appropriate inquiry is not whether
the rights restricted by the condition would be accorded preference
under the traditional constitutional analysis, but whether the
restrictions are primarily designed to meet the goals of proba-
tion." 2 The court then examined the following three factors: the
purposes of probation, the extent to which the full constitutional
guarantees available to nonprobationers should be accorded
probationers, and the legitimate needs of law enforcement."'
Employing this test, the Ninth Circuit found that the condition
of probation was improper." 4  In determining the scope of
constitutional protection available to the probationer, the court
found that the probation condition was overbroad because it
"' See United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1975)
("Conditions that unquestionably restrict otherwise inviolable constitutional rights
may properly be subject to special scrutiny to determine whether the limitation does
in fact serve the dual objectives of rehabilitation and public safety."); see also United
States v. Hughes, 964 F.2d 536, 542 (6th Cir. 1992) ("A district court may include
conditions that restrict fundamental rights, such as freedom of speech and freedom
of association, although in such cases we must review the restrictions with particular
care."), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1254 (1993).
"' Indeed, this more demanding level of scrutiny determines the validity of the
probation condition. See Bartrum, supra note 73, at 1044 (abandoning the specific
"reasonable relationship" test adopted by each jurisdiction because the "validity of a
condition of probation truly hinges on the additional level of scrutiny imposed").
110 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975).
"'Jurisdictions differ in their exact approach and semantics regarding this
additional level of scrutiny imposed. See Arthur, supra note 16, at 67 ("In the absence
of a unifying directive from the country's highest court, jurisdictions will probably
continue to apply a divergent array of methods to test the constitutionality of
probation conditions that impinge fundamental rights."). This Comment focuses on
the Consuelo-Gonzalez test as representative of the factors courts consider.
112 See 521 F.2d at 265 n.14.
11 See id. at 262.
114 See id. at 263.
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permitted searches that "could not [have] possibly serve[d] the ends
of probation.""' The court thus suppressed evidence obtained
pursuant to a search authorized by the improper condition.
1 6
2. The Extent to Which Probationers Should Be Accorded
Constitutional Rights
The crux of the standard of review as defined by the Consuelo-
Gonzalez court is the second prong, which requires determining the
extent to which the probationer should be accorded constitutional
rights. In the absence of any unifying directive from the Supreme
Court, jurisdictions have developed different approaches to this key
element. Generally there are three such approaches: the reason-
ableness standard, the balancing standard, and the least restrictive
alternative standard."
7
a. The Reasonableness Standard
The reasonableness standard requires that the probation
condition be not merely reasonably related to the purposes of
probation, but that the condition be reasonable. While the baseline
"reasonably related" test focuses on the directness of the relation-
ship between the probation condition and the purposes of proba-
tion, the reasonableness test scrutinizes the severity of the condition
in light of the crime for which the offender was convicted. In
United States v. Beros,n ' for example, the Third Circuit upheld a
condition of probation that prohibited the offender from holding
an elected position within the union or from otherwise obtaining
authority to receive or control union funds."9 After the court
engaged in the first-level reasonably related test,"' it considered
the condition against a First Amendment constitutional challenge.
115 Id. at 265. The court came to this conclusion because by authorizing
warrantless searches conducted by any law enforcement agent, the condition
permitted "an intimidating and harassing search to serve law enforcement ends totally
unrelated to either [the probationer's] prior conviction or her rehabilitation." Id.
The court suggested that a probation condition authorizing warrantless searches to
be conducted only by probation officers, however, would be permissible. See id. at
266.
116 See id.
117 See Bartrum, supra note 73, at 1041-45.
118 833 F.2d 455 (3d Cir. 1987).
"9 See id. at 467.
120 See id. (finding that "[iln this case, the condition of probation imposed was well
suited to effect the legitimate governmental purposes").
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The court held that "significant impositions upon an individual's
first amendment rights may well be reasonable in light of the
offense for which that individual was convicted."121 The court
concluded that because the offender was validly convicted of several
counts of embezzlement and misuse of union funds, the prohibi-
tions on holding elective office and obtaining authority to receive
union funds were reasonable.
122
Similarly, in United States v. Schiff,121 the Second Circuit em-
ployed a reasonableness test in considering whether a condition of
probation passed constitutional muster. The probationer in Schff
was convicted of attempted tax evasion and willful failure to file a
corporate tax return. 124 Indeed, the court found that the proba-
tioner was a "'professional tax resister.'" 125 As a special condition
of probation, the district court prohibited the probationer from
associating with any group that advocated noncompliance with or
violation of the tax laws. 126 In upholding the condition against the
probationer's First Amendment challenge, the court noted that it
had "upheld probation conditions that restrict a person's liberty
before, when, as here, those conditions bear a reasonable relation
to the crime of which the defendant stands convicted." 127 The
court then found that the probation condition was reasonable in
light of the underlying conviction.
128
While many courts employ this test of reasonableness, 129 such
a test provides insufficient protection to a probationer's constitu-
tional rights. First, the test purports to submit probation conditions
that restrict a probationer's liberty interests to a level of analysis
beyond the baseline reasonably related standard; in reality, however,
it affects little more than a further inquiry into the same question.
121 Id.
" See id. The court failed to articulate specifically how it determined that the
condition was reasonable.
123 876 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1989).
324 See id. at 273.
" Id. (citation omitted).
126 See id. at 274.
127 Id. at 276.
128 The court agreed with the district court that "it is entirely reasonable to
prohibit a person convicted of attempted tax evasion from participating in meetings
designed to advocate just such unlawful activity." Id. at 277.
" The Ninth Circuit has also employed a variation of this reasonableness test.
See United States v. Lowe, 654 F.2d 562, 567-68 (9th Cir. 1981) ("The probation
condition reasonably meets the goal of keeping the peace and deterring further
criminal activity .... Keeping the defendants away from the fence was a logical means
of prevention." (emphasis added)).
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Although the reasonableness standard explicitly considers the crime
of which the probationer was convicted, the crime is already
considered in the reasonably related test's inquiry into whether the
probation condition will serve to rehabilitate the offender.
Rehabilitation potential cannot be determined without an examina-
tion of the crime itself. Thus, the reasonably related test already
serves the function of the supposedly second-level reasonableness
analysis. Indeed, the reasonableness test may result in a purely
semantic inquiry, since a court can meet the standard without
having to evaluate any additional information.3 0
Second, the reasonableness standard fails to consider the nature
of the constitutional interest that the probation condition restricts.
It is generally agreed that some constitutional rights are valued
more highly than others.' 3 ' The reasonableness standard neglects
to account for the kind of constitutional interest infringed on by the
probation condition and therefore inadequately protects those
interests that are more fundamental than others.
b. The Balancing Standard
The balancing test requires a court to balance the government's
interest in conditioning probation against the probationer's liberty
interest. In United States v. Pierce,'32 the Ninth Circuit engaged in
this type of analysis in determining whether a probation condition
1" See Hink, supra note 35, at 488. Hinks suggests that "on the whole it appears
that the cases interpreting 'reasonable' have not added much content to probation
standards." Id. (citing People v. Blankenship, 61 P.2d 352 (Cal. 1936) (finding it a
reasonable condition of probation that the syphilitic defendant, convicted of statutory
rape, submit to a vasectomy)). Hink criticizes the reasonableness standard because
it fails to prevent future criminal behavior by the probationer. See id. In Blankenship,
for example, the probation condition merely prevented the defendant from fathering
a child; it did not, however, prevent the defendant from committing another rape.
See id.
"' Some constitutional rights are deemed fundamental, some preferred, and some
lesser. For instance, if an interest is fundamental, the court will subject any
infringement of that interest to the most stringent test, which requires that the
infringement be necessary to serve a compelling state interest. See Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S 663, 670 (1966) (characterizing the right to vote as
fundamental and therefore subjecting state poll tax to strict scrutiny). For a lesser
constitutional interest, for example, an economic interest, any infringement must
meet only the less stringent test of being rationally related to a legitimate state
interest. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (upholding a
restriction on fitting and duplicating eyeglass lenses by opticians because "[i]t is
enough ... that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a
rational way to correct it"). See generally TRIfE, supra note 31, §§ 11-1, 16-6, 16-7.
132 561 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978).
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was unconstitutional. The condition at issue required the proba-
tioner, who pleaded guilty to concealing property subject to a tax
assessment, to testify under oath to the U.S. Attorney's Office on
"all questions as to his financial condition relating to amounts and
locations of all assets."""3 After determining that the condition
was reasonably related to the purposes of probation, 3 4 the court
inquired whether the condition "involve[d] a proper accommodation
between the need for information and those Fifth Amendment
rights which [the probationer] retains. "lSS The court proposed a
balancing approach to "facilitate [such] an accommodation between
the practical needs of the probation system and the constitutional
guarantees of the Bill of Rights.
" 136
The Pierce court ultimately upheld revocation of probation on
the ground that the probationer failed to show that the probation
condition was unconstitutional. The court found that the probation-
er waived any Fifth Amendment right he might have had when he
failed to produce information within the scope of the condition and
did not provide a justification for failing to do so.' s ' Therefore,
the court did not complete its stated task of balancing the proba-
tioner's liberty interests against the state's interests in law enforce-
ment.1
3 8
The district court in United States v. Stine,1' 9 however, em-
ployed a balancing test in upholding a condition of probation
against a First Amendment challenge. Stine was convicted of
illegally receiving a firearm and, as a condition of probation, was
required to satisfactorily complete a program of psychological
counseling. 140 In response to Stine's motion to correct an illegal
sentence, the district court held that it must undertake a "balancing
133 Id. at 738.
134 See id. at 739-40.
"5 Id. at 740.
- Id. at 739.
137 See id. at 741-42.
'" See id. at 742. Although the Pierce court stated that it would use the balancing
test, the Ninth Circuit has been ambivalent about fully employing this test. See, e.g.,
United States v. Lowe, 654 F.2d 562, 569 (9th Cir. 1981) (Boochever,J., dissenting)
(advocating that the court should "balance the probational benefits against the
restriction on the exercise of first amendment rights" and therefore conclude that
"under the circumstances of this case the restriction is unwarranted"). The Lowe
majority employed the lesser "reasonableness" test, however, and thus upheld the
probation condition. See id. at 567-68.
... 521 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd, 675 F.2d 69 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 458
U.S. 1110 (1982).
140 See id. at 809.
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of defendant's constitutional rights with society's right to be
protected from further criminal acts by a convicted felon who
remains free."14 ' The court, however, did not expressly weigh the
probationer's privacy rights against society's rights. Instead, the
court concluded that society required protection from the proba-
tioner; the court never questioned that the probationer's privacy
rights would be compromised. The court's function was reduced to
determining the extent to which those privacy rights would be
restricted. 142  The court therefore upheld the condition that
required psychological counseling without explicitly considering the
weight of the probationer's First Amendment rights.
14
3
Although the balancing standard has been used by several
courts, this standard insufficiently protects fundamental rights of
probationers. As employed by courts, the balancing standard is very
fact-specific; each subsequent court is, in practice, left without
guidance to initially weigh the interests at issue. 4 4  As a result,
"the test allow[s] a court to reach either conclusion in almost every
case."145 Furthermore, this standard does not explicitly require
consideration of less restrictive alternatives. 146  Under this stan-
dard, a court can still impose conditions of probation that unneces-
sarily restrict constitutional rights that are essential to both our
underlying theories of democracy147 and probation's rehabilitative
potential. 148
141 Id. at 811.
142 "[Society's protection] could be accomplished by either incarcerating defendant
or rehabilitating him.... [P]sychological counseling could achieve rehabilitation, by
far the less restrictive alternative." Id.
143 See id. at 812. On appeal, the Third Circuit upheld the probation condition.
See Stine, 675 F.2d at 72.
144 This criticism has been summarized as follows:
The principal difficulty with the ad hoc balancing test is that it frames
the issues in such a broad and undefined way, is in effect so unstructured,
that it can hardly be described as a rule of law at all. As a legal doctrine for
affordingjudicial protection to a system of free expression, it is not tenable.
Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theoyy of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877,
912 (1963).
'1
5 Id. at 913.
146 While the Stine court concluded that psychological counseling was the "less
restrictive alternative," 521 F. Supp. at 811, it considered the probation condition
against the alternative of incarceration. Faithful application of the least restrictive
alternative standard, however, requires consideration of alternative probation
conditions other than the one proffered. See infra notes 149-61 and accompanying
text.141 See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text (discussing the First Amendment
as a fundamental right).
14 See infra notes 265-71 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of
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c. The Least Restrictive Alternative Standard
The least restrictive alternative, or "necessary," standard upholds
a condition of probation that infringes a constitutional right only if
that condition is the least restrictive alternative in meeting permissi-
ble purposes of probation. For example, the Ninth Circuit in United
States v. Terrigno149 applied such an analysis in determining wheth-
er a condition of probation was unconstitutional. The Terrigno
defendant was convicted of embezzlement and conversion of public
funds and, as a condition of probation, she was prohibited from
receiving any financial remuneration or any other thing of value for
speaking engagements, written publications, movies, or any other
media coverage dealing with her offense.1 50 Terrigno objected to
the probation condition on the ground that it restricted her First
Amendment right to speech. The court, however, disagreed and
upheld the condition on the ground that it "only forbids Terrigno's
making a profit, it does not restrict expression at all, and the
restriction obtains only during her probation term."15 The court
thus applied the principle that "if conditions are drawn so broadly
that they unnecessarily restrict otherwise lawful activities they are
impermissible."'5 2 Additionally, the court found the condition to
be a particularly effective way to remind Terrigno, in a very
practical sense, that "crime does not pay."153
First Amendment rights in maximizing the potential of probation to serve its primary
goal of rehabilitation).
14 838 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1988).
"5 See id. at 373; see also United States v. Waxman, 638 F. Supp. 1245, 1247 (E.D.
Pa. 1986) (similarly imposing a prohibition on remuneration as a probation
condition). The Waxman court upheld the followinginclusive condition of probation
against a First Amendment challenge:
He shall not profit financially or through the receipt of any property from
the sale of any TV or radio scenario, nor shall he cooperate with any writer
or author in the preparation of any such work if any member of his family
or any friend might profit thereby. He is not to profit from the sale of any
book or magazine article prepared about his life or experiences, nor shall
he cooperate with any author if any member of his family, or any friend
might profit thereby.
Id. at 1246. The Waxman court intended the condition to preclude the defendant
"from obtaining any profit or financial benefit or in any way capitalizing upon his art
theft or subsequent treatment and this provision shall be construed broadly." Id.
" Terrigno, 838 F.2d at 374-75. The Waxman court similarly found that the
defendant "may speak to whom he wishes or write what he wants. The only
restriction is that he not be paid for doing so." Waxman, 638 F. Supp. at 1246.
152 Terrigno, 838 F.2d at 374.
.5. See id. The Waxman court expressed a similar sentiment:
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State courts have also adopted the least restrictive alternative
test. For example, in People v. Pointer"" a California Court of
Appeal ruled impermissible a condition forbidding the probationer
from conceiving a child during the probationary term. Pointer was
convicted of child endangerment as a result of imposing a strict
macrobiotic diet on her two young children, after repeated advice
from her doctors that such a diet was hazardous to children. The
court's first level of analysis found the condition of probation to be
reasonably related to both the crime for which Pointer was
convicted and possible future criminality, since Pointer's conduct
before giving birth might endanger the child.'5 5 The court,
however, struck the condition as invalid because "less restrictive
alternatives [were] available." 156 For instance, the court suggested
that pregnancy testing, followed by a strict prenatal and neonatal
health program and removal of the child into foster care if
necessary, would serve the goals of probation while infringing less
on Pointer's constitutional rights. 57
Courts have also implicitly relied on the least restrictive
alternative test while promoting, by semantics, one of the other
tests. In United States v. Lawson15 the Tenth Circuit upheld a
condition of probation requiring the probationer to "disassociate
himself with any organization that has as its purpose defeating the
Internal Revenue Service laws." 159  The court contrasted the
condition of probation at issue from others that prohibited
association with groups that express opinions as to the invalidity or
unconstitutionality of the tax laws. 60 The court recognized that
the latter conditions were unnecessarily restrictive, and therefore
construed the condition at issue to involve "only organizations
advocating disobedience" of the tax laws.
16 1
[I]t is in his own interest for [the defendant] to learn that society will
neither tolerate criminal behavior nor permit the criminal to profit from it
when he can be prevented from doing so.... [I]t is also in the interest of
other members of society to learn by example that not only may they have
to pay the piper but that they cannot expect the piper to pay them for their
memoirs.
Waxman, 638 F. Supp. at 1246.
"5 199 Cal. Rptr. 357 (Ct. App. 1984).
155 See id. at 364.
l" Id. at 366.
157 See id. at 365.
158 670 F.2d 923 (10th Cir. 1982).
159 Id. at 929.
160 See id.
161 Id. at 930. In its analysis, the court explicitly relied on the reasonably related
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The least restrictive alternative standard most effectively meets
the purposes of probation by determining the conditions of
probation that provide meaningful opportunity for rehabilitation in
conjunction with sufficient public protection. Meaningful opportu-
nity for rehabilitation implies the chance to learn to live within the
community. 62 The likelihood that a probationer will learn to do
so successfully is increased by the imposition of probation condi-
tions that interfere in the least drastic way with normal community
living. Indeed, commentators who suggest that rehabilitation is a
right advocate the least restrictive setting to achieve such rehabilita-
tion.'
63
As noted earlier, recognition of the offender as a person with
legal rights is the first step toward the offender's development of a
sense of self-respect and an appreciation for human dignity.'6
Only when the probationer develops these values will she be able to
transform them into respect for society as a whole. Because the
least restrictive alternative standard guarantees to an offender all
fundamental rights except those whose infringement is absolutely
necessary to protect the public, application of this standard provides
the probationer the most meaningful opportunity to develop the
self-respect and appreciation for human dignity that are necessary
to respect society and its laws without compromising protection of
the public.
165
Furthermore, the least restrictive alternative analysis identifies
test. See id. at 929.
162 See ABA PROBATION STANDARDS, supra note 44, at 385 ("Other things being
equal, the odds are that a given defendant will learn how to live successfully in the
general community if he is dealt with in that community rather than shipped off to
the artificial and atypical environment of an institution of confinement."); supra notes
49-50 and accompanying text (discussing probation as a means of reintegrating the
offender into society).
163 See ROTMAN, supra note 50, at 155. Rotman proposes the following:
If rehabilitation is seen as a right, it cannot be used as a pretext to
impose restrictions greater than are essential to further legitimate
governmental interests. Rather, the recognition of a right to rehabilitation
implies the use of the least restrictive setting, minimal intrusion, and the
least drastic methods by which legislative aims can be achieved.
Id.
14 See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
' Indeed, application of the least restrictive alternative standard illuminates the
notion that rehabilitation and public safety are not mutually exclusive goals. See
DRESSLER, supra note 104, at 84 ("But fundamentally, the best community protection
lies in so helping those who have offended that they no longer want to offend and no
longer do violate the law.").
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the part, if any, of the probation condition that is valid. By using
this standard, a court can invalidate the portion of the probation
condition that is invalid and at the same time retain the permissible
portions.' 6 This method promotes judicial economy by avoiding
reliance by a reviewing court on remands that allow the lower court
to impose additional and permissible conditions of probation.
The least restrictive alternative test has been criticized for being
too lenient on the probationer. It has been contended that the test
fails to recognize that probationers have reduced liberty interests
since the test provides probationers the same level of protection as
that afforded nonprobationers.167 While the basic analysis of this
criticism is correct, this contention fails to acknowledge that the
substantive prohibitions and requirements embodied in probation
conditions can never be applied to nonprobationers. The imposi-
tion of the prohibition or requirement stems solely from the
probationer's status as a person convicted of a crime. For example,
prohibiting a nonprobationer from receiving money for speaking
engagements would not even satisfy the compelling state interest
analysis, while the same prohibition imposed as a condition of
probation has been upheld. 6 ' Therefore, the least restrictive
alternative test adequately provides a distinction between probation-
ers and nonprobationers while at the same time affording funda-
mental constitutional interests the protection necessary to comport
with our basic values of democracy1 69 and probation's rehabilita-
tive potential. 7 ° Furthermore, constitutional "standards" them-
" See Greenberg, supra note 57, at 79 ("Overbreadth analysis complements
reasonableness by screening out those portions of an otherwise valid condition which
bear no relation to probation's purposes, while reasonableness invalidates only totally
unrelated terms.").
The traditional constitutional analysis applied to a state action that infringes
a fundamental right requires that the infringement be necessary to meet a compelling
state interest. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 630 (1969)
(holding that restrictions limiting the fundamental right to vote must be "necessary
to promote a compelling state interest"). Therefore, an overbroad infringement of a
fundamental interest is unconstitutional. For a discussion of this criticism of the least
restrictive alternative test, see Bartrum, supra note 73, at 1045.
'" See United States v. Terrigno, 838 F.2d 371, 373 (9th Cir. 1987); United States
v. Waxman, 638 F. Supp. 1245, 1247 (E.D. Pa. 1986); supra notes 149-53 and
accompanying text.
169 See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text (discussing the First Amendment
as a fundamental right).
170 See infra notes 265-71 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of
First Amendment rights in maximizing the potential of probation to serve its primary
goal of rehabilitation).
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selves should not vary because of the types of persons involved, even
though constitutional "rights" might.
Confusion in the courts in articulating a clear standard by which
to judge probation conditions that implicate constitutional rights
results in inadequate protection of fundamental rights.171 While
most probation conditions are prohibitive in nature, recent
conditions of probation place an affirmative obligation on the
probationer that implicates fundamental rights. Because of their
unique character, these affirmative probation conditions must be
analyzed separately.
III. AFFIRMATIVE PROBATION CONDITIONS THAT
INFRINGE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
A. Examples
Most of the probation conditions that infringe First Amendment
rights are prohibitive in nature. The probationer is forbidden from
expressing opinions in certain ways, 172 from associating with
certain people or groups,173 or from holding office or employment
in a specific type of organization. 174 In some instances, however,
conditions of probation place an affirmative obligation on the
probationer that implicates First Amendment rights. Such condi-
tions can generally be divided into two categories: those that serve
to notify the public of the offense and those that serve to associate
the probationer with a certain ideology.
1. Probation Conditions that Serve Public Notice
Several courts have imposed conditions of probation that
affirmatively require the probationer to advertise her wrongdoing
to the public. In United States v. Clark,1 7 5 the Ninth Circuit re-
viewed the constitutionality of such a condition. The Clark
probationers were police officers for the Oakland Police Depart-
ment who instituted a civil rights lawsuit against the City of Oakland
for discriminating against them and for committing retaliatory acts
171 See supra notes 118-48 and accompanying text (discussing the reasonableness
test and the balancing test).
" Through advocating incitement or active participation in political demonstra-
tions, for example. See supra notes 69-71, 90 and accompanying text.
173 See supra notes 47, 91, 123-28 and accompanying text.
174 See supra notes 92-93, 118-22 and accompanying text.
175 918 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1990).
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against them after they had filed an earlier complaint with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission.176  Discovery efforts in
connection with the civil rights lawsuit revealed that the officers had
misrepresented material facts of the underlying claim; they were
charged with and ultimately convicted of perjury.177 The officers
were granted probation on the condition that they publish an
apology in both the local newspaper and the police department's
newsletter.178
The Ninth Circuit upheld the probation condition against a First
Amendment challenge as within the sentencing court's discre-
tion. 179 The court found the record to support a conclusion that
the sentencing judge imposed the condition for purposes of
rehabilitation. Further, the court held that because neither officer
had admitted guilt or taken responsibility for her actions, "a public
apology may serve a rehabilitative purpose." i"' The court noted
that the first step toward rehabilitation is the offender's recognition
of fault.' 8 '
Another example of an affirmative probation condition that
serves as public notice of an offense is the requirement that
offenders convicted of driving under the influence ("DUI") affix to
their cars a bumper sticker to that effect. Although commentators
have referred to such a probation condition as a "scarlet letter,"
18 2
176 See id. at 844.
'7 See id. at 844-45.
" See id. at 845. The required apology stated:
My name is [Johnnie Clark/Theresajeffery]. I am a former Oakland Police
Officer. On March 7, 1989, I was convicted by ajury verdict of perjury ....
I acknowledge that I have betrayed the trust and confidence placed in me
as a police officer by lying, and I recognize that I have undermined
reasonable efforts to achieve a racially unbiased workplace .... I regret my
wrongdoing and apologize for my misdeeds.
Id.
179 See id. at 848 (holding that "[b]ecause the probation condition was reasonably
related to the permissible end of rehabilitation, requiring it was not an abuse of
discretion").
" Id.; see also Brilliant, supra note 106, at 1363 (noting that one judge who
imposes public apology probation conditions believes that "'an open and public
admission ... make[s] it more likely that the defendant will not commit further
crimes'" (citation omitted)).
181 See Clark, 918 F.2d at 848 ("'It is almost axiomatic that the first step toward
rehabilitation of an offender is the offender's recognition that he was at fault.'"
(quoting Gollaher v. United States, 419 F.2d 520, 530 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
960 (1969))).
" Brilliant, supra note 106, at 1362-64 (referring to a probation condition
requiring a drunk driver to put a bumper sticker on his car as a modern day "scarlet
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a Florida court upheld the condition in Goldschmitt v. State.8 3
Goldschmitt objected to the probation condition on the ground that
when the state compelled him to affix the bumper sticker to his
car,'84 it violated the First Amendment. The court rejected this
argument, however, because it found that the required bumper
sticker did not contain an ideological message.
85
State v. Bateman186 serves as a final example of a probation
condition that notifies the public of the offense. The offender in
Bateman was convicted of sexual abuse and subsequently placed on
probation, on the condition that he post signs on his residence and
on his car reading "Dangerous Sex Offender. " '" The court
affirmed the sentencing court on the procedural ground that
neither the scope of review nor the applicable statute allowed the
court to determine the validity of the condition.
188
The Bateman condition of probation is similar to that in
Goldschmitt, in that it serves as a public warning. A concurring
opinion in Bateman noted that the trial judge intended that the
required signs warn the public of the danger posed by the proba-
tioner.'89 In this way, the trial court created the condition of
probation to meet probation's goal of public safety.9 0 Similarly,
although the above examples demonstrate that an affirmative
obligation imposed as a condition of probation implicates First
letter"). See generally Dan Connally, Note, When Hester Piynne Drives Drunk: An
Examination of the Constitutional Challenges to the Requirement of a 'Scarlet Bumper
Sticker" as a Condition of Probation on DUI Offenses, 41 OKLA. L. REv. 529 (1988). For
the related issue of the propriety of publicity as a probation condition for corpora-
tions, see generally Andrew Cowan, Note, Scarlet Letters for Corporations? Punishment
by Publicity Under the New Sentencing Guidelines, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 2387 (1992).
' 490 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
1The bumper sticker read "CONVICTED D.U.I.-RESTRICTED LICENSE." Id.
at 124.
"' -Suffice it to say... that the message involved in the present case is 'no more
ideological than a permit to park in a handicapped parking space'...." Id. at 125
(citation omitted). For examples of conditions that implicate First Amendment rights
by imposing ideological messages, see infra notes 191-213 and accompanying text.
1- 771 P.2d 314 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
'18 Id. at 316.
188 See id. at 319.
"" See id. (Riggs, J., concurring) ("'The community has a right to know that Mr.
Bateman is a dangerous sex offender.'" (quoting the trial judge)); see also Brilliant,
supra note 106, at 1366 (quoting the trial judge as responding to the "'lack of
community recognition of dangerous people'").
'90 See Bateman, 771 P.2d at 320 (RiggsJ., concurring) (noting that the "condition
of probation imposed in this case was only one of several conditions of probation and
was primarily designed to provide protection to the public in the light of the fact that
defendant's previous jail sentence for a similar offense has failed").
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Amendment interests, the condition directly serves to notify and
thereby protect the public.
2. Probation Conditions that Impose an Ideology
Some sentencing courts have gone so far as to require that the
probationer, as a condition of probation, associate or become
associated with a particular ideology. These efforts have generally
been the result of an attempt to educate or to reform the proba-
tioner. For example, a type of probation condition imposed on
offenders requires the offender to either become a member of or
contribute money to a political advocacy organization. In a recent
case,' the offender pleaded guilty to violating several environ-
mental statutes. As a condition of his probation, the offender was
required for the duration of his five-year probationary term to
become a member in good standing of the Sierra Club, a political
advocacy organization that lobbies and litigates on behalf of
environmental causes. 9 2 Similarly, a commercial hunting guide
and his brother who pleaded guilty to federal hunting charges were
required to contribute fifty dollars each to the National Wildlife
Federation as a condition of their probation. 9 ' The National
Wildlife Federation is also a political advocacy organization that
lobbies on behalf of environmental and conservation issues. This
type of probation condition has not been limited to the context of
environmental crimes: a New York court required a probationer
convicted of attempted criminal possession of a weapon to contrib-
ute $2500 to an organization politically advocating gun control.'9 4
Another type of probation condition requires the offender to
associate with an organization or a program that promotes reli-
gion.'95  The trial court in Owens v. Kelley... imposed on the
193 See Ohio v. Bohnert, No. B91-2520 (C.P. Hamilton County, Ohio Nov. 6, 1991).
in The Sierra Club is not characterized as a charitable organization under Internal
Revenue Service rules because of its advocacy and lobbying activities. See SIERRA
CLUB, ANNUAL REPORT 1990-1991, at 11 (1992);see also Cruel and Unusual Punishment,
supra note 7, at 9 (describing another Ohio case in which the owner of an electroplat-
ing company pleaded guilty to violations of the state's hazardous waste laws and was
placed on probation on the condition that he become a member in good standing of
the Sierra Club).
1 See Hunting Guide Sentenced, supra note 7, at 5A.
See People v. Warren, 452 N.Y.S.2d 50 (App. Div. 1982) (describing the holding
of the trial court). The appeals court reviewing this condition of probation held it
invalid. See id. at 51 ("We find invalid the imposition of a contribution that would
advance one side of this controversy.").
195 For a recent example of a probation condition that explicitly required the
IMPOSITION OF IDEOLOGY
probationer, who was convicted of violating the state's controlled
substances act, a requirement that he participate in a criminal
rehabilitation program entitled Emotional Maturity Instruction
("EMI"). 19 The probationer objected on the grounds that the
EMI program was religiously oriented, but the district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the state, finding no genuine issues
of material fact based on written materials that described the EMI
program.
198
The Eleventh Circuit reversed, however, because it found that
there was a clear factual dispute as to the content and nature of the
oral instruction of the EMI program.'99 In remanding consider-
ation of the nature of the EMI program's oral instruction, the court
noted that
a condition of probation which requires the probationer to adopt
religion or to adopt any particular religion would be unconstitu-
tional. It follows that a condition of probation which requires the
probationer to submit himself to a course advocating the adoption
of religion or a particular religion also transgresses the First
Amendment.
200
The court therefore recognized an additional boundary beyond
which a probation condition could not stand.
Similarly, the trial court in Warner v. Orange County Department
of Probation"°1 required that the probationer become associated
with a particular religious ideology. Warner was convicted of
driving while ability-impaired, his third such offense within
approximately a year. 12 The trial court imposed a seemingly
innocuous, and very common, condition of probation: that the
probationer attend Alcoholics Anonymous ("AA"). 211 Warner,
however, objected to the condition on the ground that mandatory
defendant and her four children to attend weekly church services for one year, see
U.S.Judge Orders Woman to Go to Churchfor a Year, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1994, at B18.
1- 681 F.2d 1362 (11th Cir. 1982).
1 See id. at 1364.
198 The district court ruled that the EMI program did not violate the First
Amendment because the program had a secular purpose and a primary secular effect.
See id. at 1365.
199 See id.
21o Id. (citation omitted).
201 827 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
202 See id. at 262.
2o" See id. Drug and alcohol treatment programs are often required as a condition
of probation to promote rehabilitation of the offender. See supra note 15 and
accompanying text.
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attendance at AA meetings violated his right to free exercise of
religion. As Warner argued, the AA program included "language
acknowledging the existence of a Higher Power and the necessity of
subjugating oneself to such a Power as a precondition to successful
treatment of alcoholism."2 4 Warner claimed to be an atheist.
215
After the criminal court dismissed Warner's motion for moot-
ness,216 he brought a § 198327 claim on the grounds that his
forced participation in AA violated the Establishment Clause of the
U.S. Constitution.
20 8
The district court held that Warner's complaint adequately
alleged a violation of his constitutional rights.0 9 First, the court
found that atheism falls within First Amendment protection because
the "'government may not compel affirmation of religious be-
lief.' 21° Second, the court held that the condition was obligatory,
since Warner could have rejected the AA treatment for religious
reasons, "but only at the potential cost of incarceration."
2 11
Finally, the court held that despite the fact that requiring AA
attendance serves the secular purpose of rehabilitation, "AA
arguably has a primary effect of advancing religion."212  These
factors, along with the religious nature of AA and the vulnerability
of the plaintiff, convinced the district court to deny the probation
department's motion to dismiss Warner's complaint.
213
While Owens and Warren demonstrate that some reviewing
courts might closely analyze probation conditions that associate the
probationer with an ideology, these kinds of probation conditions
merit special attention for several reasons. Ideology-related
conditions differ from other probation conditions in many ways that
suggest that they are inappropriate to impose as a condition of
probation.2 14  As a result, the infrequency with which probation
204 Warner, 827 F. Supp. at 262.
" See id. at 263.
20 See id. Before the criminal court heard Warner's case, his probation officer
provided him with several names of alcohol abuse counselors who could provide
treatment without emphasis on God or spirituality. See id.
20.7 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
208 See Warner, 827 F. Supp. at 263.
209 See id. at 266.
211 Id. at 265 (quoting Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990)).
211 Id.
212 Id. at 266.
210 See id. at 266-68 (discussing the vulnerability of the plaintiff to mandatory
exposure to the religious indoctrination of AA principles).
214 See infra notes 217-24 and accompanying text.
IMPOSITION OF IDEOLOGY
conditions are appealed2 15 and the current confusion within the
courts as to the proper standard to be applied2 16 significantly
affect fundamental First Amendment rights and require that
reviewing courts develop a clear standard to guide sentencing courts
in the use of their discretion.
B. Ideology-Related Conditions of Probation
1. How They Differ
Conditions of probation that affirmatively require an offender
to become associated with an ideology differ from other conditions
of probation in several ways. Ideology-related conditions relate to
the purposes of probation only indirectly, by attempting to reform
the offender and to mold her into adopting certain qualities not
necessary to be a productive member of society. Although educa-
tion in the implications and effects of environmental laws serves the
dual purposes of probation, rehabilitation and public safety,
membership in or financial support of an environmental advocacy
organization is unnecessary to the goals of probation. There are
other ways in which to educate an offender about environmental
issues and applicable laws.
2 17
In contrast, prohibitive conditions of probation directly relate
to the purposes of probation by removing the probationer from the
circumstances that originally caused the criminal offense. For
example, if the offense occurred during a political demonstration,
a prohibition on active participation in public demonstrations will
ensure that the probationer does not repeat the offense.
218
Similarly, if the offense was an impropriety related to a union
position, a prohibition on holding a union position or a position of
authority within any organization that receives union funds ensures
the probationer will be unable to repeat the offense.2 19  These
215 See supra note 55.
211 See supra notes 105-71 and accompanying text.
211 See infra notes 254-60 and accompanying text (discussing the importance for
First Amendment purposes of an ideologically neutral vehicle of compelled speech).
218 See, e.g., In re Mannino, 92 Cal. Rptr. 880, 886-89 (Ct. App. 1971) (upholding
conditions of probation to the extent that they prohibited the probationer's active
participation in demonstrations when the probationer's conviction arose out of a
student demonstration that turned violent), overruled on other grounds, 851 P.2d 802
(Cal. 1993).
2'19 See, e.g., United States v. Hughes, 964 F.2d 536,542 (6th Cir. 1992) (noting that
an effect of the prohibition will be to "rehabilitate [the probationer] by removing him
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probation conditions meet both goals of probation by promoting
rehabilitation of the probationer and ensuring public safety.
Furthermore, the assertion that ideology-related conditions of
probation serve the purposes of probation at all is tenuous at best.
A requirement that an offender join a political advocacy group does
nothing to further the public safety.22 In addition, it is unlikely
that a contemptuous member of the Sierra Club will benefit from
any educational aspects of membership.
221
By contrast, affirmative conditions of probation that notify the
public of the offense serve not only public protection and rehabilita-
tion, but also other permissible purposes of probation. In the Clark
case, for example, the harm committed by the officers to the police
department was reputational. Requiring a public apology in this
situation can be viewed as a form of restitution to the aggrieved
party in that the apology will help to restore the police department
to its pre-perjury reputation within the community. Such restitution
is explicitly authorized by the Federal Probation Act, the SRA, and
many state probation statutes. 222 Similarly, public notice proba-
tion conditions serve rehabilitation by ensuring that the probationer
will be removed from circumstances that caused the offense and by
enlisting the public's help in this goal.
223
from the environment that originally led to his criminal activity"), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 1254 (1993); United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1979) (noting
that probation conditions that prohibited a probationer, convicted of violating the
Federal Election Campaign Act, from running for political office and from engaging
in political activity "assure[] that the [probationer], while free to return to community
life and earn his livelihood, will not be tempted to engage in illicit electoral activity
during his probation, thus serving the purpose of protection").
20 By itself such a condition of probation does not ensure public safety because
it does not remove the probationer from the circumstances that originally led to the
underlying violation. It is only in conjunction with other conditions of probation that
public safety might be promoted. Indeed, all three cases that required membership
in or contribution to an advocacy organization imposed additional conditions of
probation that sought to protect the public from future criminality. See Ohio v.
Bohnert, No. B91-2520 (C.P. Hamilton County, Ohio Nov. 6, 1991) (imposing
additional probation conditions prohibiting the probationer from becoming involved
in any waste disposal business and requiring the probationer to perform community
service); Cruel and Unusual Punishment, supra note 7, at 9 (imposing additional
probation conditions of home incarceration and community service); Hunting Guide
Sentenced, supra note 7, at 5A (imposing additional probation condition prohibiting
probationers from any hunting activity).
"2 See Felsenthal, supra note 7, at BI, B2 (quoting a Sierra Club vice president as
saying, "'Realistically, these members [probationers compelled to join] aren't going
to be active participants in our efforts' ... [since w]hat gets said at group meetings
'may go in one ear and out the other'").
See supra notes 38-42, 64 and accompanying text.
See Filcik, supra note 38, at 322-23 (noting that public signs not only "inform
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Ideology-related probation conditions purport to rehabilitate the
offender through education. The nature of this education, however,
is not limited to an explanation of the laws or to suggestions at how
to end an addiction; rather, the education extends beyond this
proper boundary into the realm of moral education that imposes on
constitutional rights. 2 4  As discussed below, the Constitution
protects the freedom from government imposition of ideology.
2. Constitutional Aspects
It is useful to examine the constitutional aspects of government-
compelled association with, or support of, an ideology to analyze
how such compulsion should be scrutinized when imposed as a
condition of probation.
a. Protected Speech Is Implicated
Compelled association with, or support of, a political advocacy
organization implicates fundamental rights protected by the First
Amendment. In Wooley v. Maynard,225 the Supreme Court ruled
that the "right of freedom of thought protected by the First
Amendment ... includes both the right to speak freely and the
right to refrain from speaking at all."226 This right to refrain from
speaking stems from the First Amendment freedom to be "intellec-
the public of the probationer's status affording them the opportunity to assist in the
defendant's rehabilitation," but also enable the public to "assist in monitoring a
probationer's behavior by contacting authorities when necessary").
" See Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362, 1365-66 (11th Cir. 1982). The Owens court
recognized that "there is a fine line between rehabilitation efforts which encourage
lawful conduct by an appeal to morality and the benefits of moral conduct to the life
of the probationer, and efforts which encourage lawfulness through adherence to
religious belief. Nevertheless, this is the line that must not be overstepped." Id.
5 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
6 Id. at 714. The Court earlier addressed this issue in the context of state efforts
to implement an integrated bar association. See Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820
(1961). In Lathrop, however, a majority of the Court declined to address the First
Amendment issue. See id. at 845 ("[O]n this record we have no sound basis for
deciding appellant's constitutional claim insofar as it rests on the assertion that his
rights of free speech are violated .... "). Justices Harlan, Frankfurter, Black, and
Douglas, believed that the issue was properly raised in front of the Court. Justice
Black, in a lengthy dissent, noted that "I can think of few plainer, more direct
abridgments of the freedoms of the First Amendment than to compel persons to
support candidates, parties, ideologies or causes that they are against." Id. at 873
(Black, J., dissenting). Similarly, Justice Douglas concluded that "the First Amend-
ment applies strictures designed to keep our society from becoming moulded into
patterns of conformity which satisfy the majority." Id. at 885 (DouglasJ., dissenting).
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tually and spiritually diverse or even contrary" that was recognized
by the Court in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.
22 7
The issue in Wooley was whether a state could constitutionally
require a person to display on his private property an ideological
message that he found repugnant. A New Hampshire statute
mandated that noncommercial vehicles use license plates bearing
the state motto, "Live Free or Die."228 Maynard objected to
displaying the motto on his automobile since as aJehovah's Witness
he found the motto repugnant to his moral, religious, and political
beliefs. Maynard was prosecuted for violation of the statute three
times within two months.2 29 The Supreme Court found that the
state invaded the "sphere of intellect" by requiring that an individu-
al "be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideologi-
cal point of view he finds unacceptable."2 0 The Court concluded
that the "First Amendment protects the right of individuals to hold
a point of view different from the majority and to refuse to foster
... an idea they find morally objectionable."
231
Courts have further refined the theory of forced speech and
association. The determination whether a state action compels
speech or association is a question of fact.232 A review of the
cases has led a federal court to conclude that First Amendment
speech was commonly found in an "organization's advancement of
positions affecting matters of public debate."23 3 In addition, the
public's perception of the relationship between the compelled
activity and the participant is important. 234 For example, the
- 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943). The Court in Barnette proceeded to note that "[if
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." Id.
at 642.
228 See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 707.
22' See id. at 707-09.
2
3
0 Id. at 715.
231 Id. One commentator has termed this right to be free from government
compulsion to engage in speech or associational activities as a "negative right" and
its protection as "negative protection." David B. Gaebler, First Amendment Protection
Against Government Compelled Expression and Association, 23 B.C. L. REv. 995, 996
(1982).
232 See, e.g., Steirer v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 987 F.2d 989, 995 (3d Cir.)
(noting that to decide whether the compelled conduct is expressive, the court must
look to "the nature of the activity in conjunction with the factual context and
environment in which it is undertaken"), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 85 (1993).
23 Washington Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Bar Found., 795 F. Supp. 50,55 (D.
Mass. 1992), afj'd, 993 F.2d 962 (1st Cir. 1993).
21 See Wooley, 430 U.S. 705, 717 n.15 (distinguishing the national motto "In God
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court in Steirer v. Bethlehem Area School District3 5 ruled that a
community service requirement by a public high school did not
compel speech because the plaintiffs failed to show that the public
perceived that the students were expressing a belief in the value of
altruism.
2 16
Wooley and its progeny dictate that compelling a probationer to
become a member of a political advocacy organization similarly
breaches the promise of First Amendment protection. The Sierra
Club,2 7 for example, is an organization dedicated to environmen-
tal preservation.2 1 It is probable that any person convicted of an
environmental crime does not support the Sierra Club's political
agenda. The compelled support of this ideology, whether most
Americans agree with it or not, intrudes on the freedom to refuse
to foster an ideology one finds objectionable.
239
We Trust" that is on U.S. currency from the state license plate because currency is
not really associated with the bearer, since it is "generally carried in a purse or pocket
and need not be displayed to the public"); see also Norman L. Cantor, Forced Payments
to Service Institutions and Constitutional Interests in Ideological Non-Association, 36
RurGERs L. REV. 3, 15 (1983) (noting that "it is not as clear that there is forced
ideological or political association in the absence of compelled payor identification"
with the compelled expression); Gaebler, supra note 231, at 1010 ("Unless the
government requires an individual to do something which reasonably identifies him
with a message it is difficult to describe the government's actions as compelling
expression."); cf. Washington Legal Found., 993 F.2d at 979 ("To affect First
Amendment rights, there must be a connection between dissenters and the
organization so that dissenters reasonably understand that they are supporting the
message propagated by recipient organizations.").
5 987 F.2d 989 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 85 (1993).
2"6 See id. at 995 (noting the "significance .for First Amendment purposes of the
viewer's perception"); id. at 997 (stating that "plaintiffs have produced no evidence
that people in the community who see these students performing community service
are likely to perceive their actions as an intended expression of a particularized
message of their belief in the value of community service and altruism").
. The Sierra Club will be used throughout the remainder of this Comment as an
example of a political advocacy group to which a probationer might be compelled to
join as a condition of probation.
m See SIERRA CLUB, FINANCIAL REPORT 2 (1993).
The Sierra Club ... is a[n] ... organization established to explore, enjoy
and protect the wild places of the earth; to practice and promote the
responsible use of the earth's ecosystems and resources; to educate and
enlist humanity to protect and restore the quality of the natural and human
environment; and to use all lawful means to carry out these objectives.
Id.
239 See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715 ("The fact that most individuals agree with the
thrust of [the state] motto is not the test; most Americans also find the flag salute
acceptable."); cf. Gaebler, supra note 231, at 1005 (noting that "[w]hether or not the
individual agrees with the views he is required to express, and whether or not others
perceive his coerced expression as sincere make no difference" to an individual's First
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Furthermore, the activities of the Sierra Club contribute greatly
to matters of public debate. The public debate over environmental
issues has increased tremendously over the last two decades. Both
the federal and state governments spend a substantial amount of
money implementing environmental laws and the courts are
frequently engaged in battles that implicate environmental issues.
Environmental issues arise as major issues in presidential cam-
paigns 40 as well as in international trade agreements.241 The
Sierra Club devotes its annual budget of over fifty million dollars to
advancing one side of the environmental controversy through
lobbying and advocacy. 242 The Sierra Club also engages in exten-
sive litigation in federal and state courts248 and has an affiliated
Amendment interest in selfhood).
240 See Casey Bukro, Ecologists Certain About TheirFavorite, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 1,1988,
§ News, at 11 ("The environment has emerged as an election issue in a year when
planet Earth appeared to strike back against years of pollution abuses."); John B.
Oakes, Bush vs. Bush on the Environment, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1988, at 31 ("[T]he
environmental question is as significant as any now facing the American voter, and
more significant than most."); Keith Schneider, Clinton and Bush Show Contradictions
in BalancingJobs and Conservation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1992, at A18 (discussing the
candidates' environmental records and noting that Clinton's aides "say one of the big
reasons for their candidate's lead in the national polls is his support for a Govern-
ment that will take an active role in reshaping the nation's environmental and energy
programs"); Michael Weisskopf, Rival Running Mates Clash on Shades of Green, WASH.
POST, Aug. 8, 1992, at Al (calling the environment issue a "staple of presidential
politics").
241 For example, environmental concerns played a large role in the Clinton
administration's negotiations and ultimate passage of the North American Free Trade
Agreement ("NAFTA"). See Harold Gilliam, How Green Is NAFTA? Two Environmen-
talists-One Pro, One Con-Take on the Treaty, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 24, 1993, at 5/Z1
(outlining the debate over NAFTA's impact on the environment); Charlotte Grimes,
Side Agreements Aimed at NAFTA Opponents, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 13, 1993,
at 5B (noting that President Clinton's "administration sought the.., environmental
side agreement[] in hope of defusing ... arguments" that NAFTA would add to
environmental problems along the U.S.-Mexican border); Gary Lee, At Border,
NAFTA's Environmental Promise Is Murky, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 1993, at Al, A8
(discussing the predicted environmental effects of NAFTA and the lobbying
campaigns of many environmental groups).
242 See SIERRA CLUB, supra note 192, at 6-9 (year-end financial statement, year
ending December 31, 1991). The Sierra Club lobbies at the local, state, national, and
international levels. See id. at 6. Nearly 25% of the Club's budget was directed
toward influencing public policy in fiscal year 1991. See id. at 11. A primary goal of
the Club can be summed up with the following quote: "We offer to America and the
world our vision of humanity living in harmony with nature. We dedicate ourselves
to achieving this vision as we reaffirm our passionate commitment to explore, enjoy,
and protect the Earth." Id. at 8.
245 Most of the Sierra Club's litigation efforts are maintained by its legally
independent affiliate, the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund. See SIERRA CLUB, supra
note 238, at 3.
IMPOSITION OF IDEOLOGY
political action committee. 244  Due to the highly visible and
influential activities of the Sierra Club, forced membership in the
organization certainly implicates compelled speech.
Finally, there is a likelihood that the public will perceive
membership in the Sierra Club as an affirmation of the participant's
support and belief. Unlike Steirer, in which all of the students in the
public school system were required to perform community service
as a precondition to high school graduation, the lone probationer
who is compelled to become a member in good standing of the
Sierra Club does not have the advantage of safety in numbers. The
natural perception of one who attends Sierra Club meetings is that
the person supports the organization and its goals. To correct this
misperception, the probationer would have to reveal the true
reasons for her recent membership and risk humiliation, being
ostracized, or even harassed. Such harassment should not be the
cost of exercising one's legitimate right to refuse to foster an
ideology she finds objectionable.
245
Even merely requiring a probationer to contribute money to a
political advocacy organization implicates protected speech. While
many authorities agree that a probationer can be required as a
condition of probation to contribute money to a charitable
organization,246 compelling contribution to a political advocacy
organization crosses the line into protected speech. The Supreme
Court has recognized that contributing to a political organization is
a form of speech. In Buckley v. Valeo, 247 the Court held that
"[m]aking a contribution, like joining a political party, serves to
2144 The Sierra Club Political Committee supports the Club's belief that "commit-
ment to environmental protection is an important qualification for those who seek
public office." SIERRA CLUB, supra note 192, at 11.
245 See Gaebler, supra note 231, at 1003-07 (arguing that although compelled
speech does not preclude the opportunity to disavow the compelled expression, the
necessity of disavowal deprives the individual of the right to remain silent and
furthermore fails to remedy the loss of control over the projection of one's public
identity).2
11 See United States v. Posner, 694 F. Supp. 881, 883, 887-89 (S.D. Fla. 1988)
(upholding a condition of probation that required defendant to contribute $3,000,000
and 20 hours per week to formulate and implement a "meaningful plan dedicated to
alleviating the problem of the homeless in South Florida"); People v. Burleigh, 727
P.2d 873, 874-75 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) (upholding a condition of probation that
defendant, who pleaded guilty to unlawful dispensing of a controlled substance,
contribute $5000 to a mental health center that conducted drug treatment programs);
see also Howard, supra note 43, at 541-44 (discussing the propriety of requiring
charitable contributions as a probation condition for corporate defendants).
247 424 U.S. 1 (1975).
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affiliate a person" with the organization receiving the contribu-
tion. 4 ' Further, a "contribution serves as a general expression of
support."249  As such, contributing to an organization for the
purpose of spreading a political message is protected speech under
the First Amendment.
Most importantly, freedom of expression through the contribu-
tion of money encompasses the right to be free from compelled
contribution. In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,2 50 the Court
held that "[t]he fact that the appellants are compelled to make,
rather than prohibited from making, contributions for political
purposes works no less an infringement of their constitutional
rights." 25' Therefore, when a state authorizes an "agency shop"
whereby every employee must pay a fee to the union equal to
membership dues, regardless of whether the employee is a member,
the union cannot use the money to support political issues beyond
those related to its duties as bargaining representative of the
employees. 52 Similarly, if a probationer is required as a condition
of probation to contribute money to a charitable organization, the
state compels speech by ordering that the contribution be made to
a political advocacy organization.
25
3
b. Compelled Speech Is Not Justified
The government cannot compel speech unless the compulsion
serves a compelling state interest. 254  To support compelled
speech, the compelling state interest must first be ideologically
neutral. 2" The Wooley court held that "where the State's interest
is to disseminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to some,
such interest cannot outweigh an individual's First Amendment
248 Id. at 22. In Buckley, the recipients were groups supporting candidates for
political office and individual candidates.
249 Id. at 21.
2 0 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
2-" Id. at 234.
2'2 See id. at 235-36.
253 See also Washington Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Bar Found., 795 F. Supp.
50, 55 (D. Mass. 1992) ("In prohibiting coerced contributions to... partisan issues,
courts recognize that the First Amendment mandates that the interchange of
information and ideas be free from compulsion."), affd, 993 F.2d 962 (1st Cir. 1993).
2 See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715-16 (1977); Gaebler, supra note 231,
at 1016-17 (suggesting that courts balance the infringement of "negative" First
Amendment rights against any governmental interest furthered by the compelled
expression).
2" See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717.
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right to avoid becoming the courier for such message." 2 6 Second-
ly, Wooley requires that there be no more narrow manner in which
the compelling state interest can be achieved.257 If there are less
drastic means that achieve the same purpose, then compelling
speech through forced membership or support is unconstitutional.
The state's interest in requiring membership or support of the
Sierra Club as a condition of probation for someone convicted of an
environmental crime is rehabilitative. The Sierra Club, however, is
not an ideologically neutral vehicle for this rehabilitation. The
Third Circuit in Galda v. Rutgers5 8 had to determine whether an
organization supported by mandatory student fees at a public
university was ideologically neutral. The court looked to the nature
of the organization and its primary function in considering whether
it maintained a sufficient educational component to outweigh the
ideological component. 259 The court found that the educational
aspects of the group were only incidental to promotion of its
political goals, and therefore, the state had not met its burden of
showing a compelling state interest.
260
Although the Sierra Club's agenda includes public education,
the organization is a political advocacy group that has an interest in
educating the public not only in environmental issues and laws, but
toward a certain environmental philosophy.261 The history of the
Sierra Club reveals that the group was born out of a desire for social
change. 262  Education is only an incidental aspect of the Sierra
Club. Furthermore, any educational value of the organization will
be lost on a probationer who is opposed to the Sierra Club's
ideological aims.
2- Id.
2 See id. at 716-17.
- 772 F.2d 1060 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1065 (1986).
259 See id. at 1065-66. It is interesting to note that the organization at issue in
Galda was the New Jersey Public Interest Research Group, whose goals include
environmental preservation. See id. at 1061 n.1.
'o See id. at 1065 (finding that the "educational benefits are only 'incidental'-
arising from or accompanying the principal objectives-and subordinate to the group's
function of promoting its political and ideological aims").
261 See supra notes 237-44 and accompanying text.
262 Change continues to be a focus in the Club's goals; thus, it engages in lobbying
and litigation. See SIERRA CLUB, supra note 192, at 3 ("We see fundamental
changes.... That means ending the dominance of short sighted political and
economic interests, and adopting national and global priorities, policies, and values
aimed at leaving a healthy environment for future generations.").
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Finally, the state can satisfy its legitimate interest in rehabilita-
tion with means that infringe less drastically on the constitutional
right to be free from compelled speech and association. A person
who has been convicted of an environmental crime would surely
benefit from an education in the nature, scope, and implications of
the environmental laws. Yet this education need not contain an
ideological slant. Courses offered by legitimate charitable organiza-
tions26 or public schools might fit this need. Because the state
can achieve its legitimate and substantial interest in rehabilitation
with a program that infringes less on fundamental constitutional
rights, compelling a probationer to join or support a political
advocacy organization should be unconstitutional under this
traditional constitutional analysis.
2 64
3. Ideology-Related Probation Conditions Obstruct
Meaningful Rehabilitation of the Probationer
By unnecessarily infringing on the right to be free from
compelled speech, ideology-related probation conditions impede full
rehabilitation of the probationer. First Amendment protections
provide the opportunity for individual self-fulfillment, autonomy,
and human dignity.265 According to the social contract doctrine,
society grants its members the guarantee of this freedom in
exchange for the members' agreement to abide by society's legal
rules.266 In a democracy where members of the community have
63 For example, the Environmental Law Institute in Washington, D.C. provides
such courses and is classified as a charitable organization under § 501(c)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code. See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., ANNUAL REPORT 1992, at
33 (1993).
264 Whereas some courts considering the constitutionality of probation conditions
have explicitly rejected the notion of applying a traditional constitutional analysis, see,
e.g., United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 n.14 (9th Cir. 1975),
courts that have been presented with ideology-related probation conditions have
adopted the traditional constitutional analysis, see Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362,
1365 (11th Cir. 1982); Warner v. Orange County Dep't of Probation, 827 F. Supp.
261, 265-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
21 See Baker, supra note 30, at 992 (noting that "individual selffulfillment and
participation in change arefundamental purposes of thefirst amendment"); Richards, supra
note 32, at 68 (noting that "the value of free expression... rests... on deeper moral
premises regarding the general exercise of autonomous expressive and judgmental
capacity and the good that this affords in human life").
21 Professor Baker explains the social contract doctrine as follows:
Tojustify legal obligation, the community must respect individuals as equal,
rational and autonomous moral beings. For the community legitimately to
expect individuals to respect collective decisions, i.e., legal rules, the
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a right to participate in the rulemaking process, everyone benefits
from the exchange.
Conversely, when society breaches its contract promise of free
expression, everyone is harmed. Imposition of a probation
condition that compels expression robs the probationer of her self-
respect and integrity.26 Without these fundamental values, the
probationer will be unable to become a healthy and productive
member of society. 8' And, without the foundation of self-respect
and dignity, the probationer will be unable to respect, and will be
unwilling to abide by, society's rules. As a result, the probationer's
complete rehabilitation is obstructed and society is thereby harmed.
To fully encourage meaningful rehabilitation of the probationer,
probation conditions must not coerce belief or expression. The
sentencing court should not cross the line from permissible
educational and rehabilitative efforts into coerced compliance with
society's value system.261 Indeed, as noted earlier,2"° rehabilita-
tion begins with change within the offender. By guaranteeing the
probationer the right to be free from compelled speech, the
probationer is allowed to engage in the process of self-discovery,
without which rehabilitation will remain incomplete.
2 71
community must respect the dignity and equal worth of its members.
Baker, supra note 30, at 991.67 See id. at 992 (noting that "people's choices, their definition and development
of themselves, must be respected-otherwise they become mere objects for manipula-
tion or means for rationalizing someone else's ideals or desires"); id. at 1000 (noting
that "respect for the integrity and autonomy of the individual usually requires giving
each person at least veto power over the use of her own.., speech"); Emerson, supra
note 144, at 919 ("The attempt to coerce belief is not only one of the most
destructive forms of restricting expression but it affords no substantial protection to
any legitimate individual or social interest. It invades the innermost privacy of the
individual and cuts off the right of expression at its source.").
" See Baker, supra note 30, at 996 ("Nevertheless, to the extent that speech is
involuntary, is not chosen by the speaker, the speech act does not involve the self-
realization or the self-fulfillment of the speaker.").269 See ROTMAN, supra note 50, at 6 ("When the coercive methods of criminal law
fail to force compliance to that minimum of morality that forms the core of the
criminolegal systems, rehabilitation has to seek such compliance through a learning
process, rather than by becoming a subtler and more intrusive form of coercion.");
id. at 118 ("The simple capacity to function in society without infringing its criminal
law is a valid goal for rehabilitative endeavors, which is not necessarily equivalent to
coerced compliance with society's value system."). It is important to note that many
ideology-related probation conditions do not even coerce compliance with society's
value system. Membership in the Sierra Club, for example, exposes a probationer to
values of only a segment of society, which in fact through its lobbying and litigation
efforts is trying to change society's values as reflected in the law. See supra note 262.
2 o See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
' See ROTMAN, supra note 50, at 8 (noting that for full rehabilitation, "[d]ialogue
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4. Proposal for a Heightened Constitutional Scrutiny
Affirmative conditions of probation that infringe on the
constitutionally protected right to be free from compelled speech
merit a heightened constitutional scrutiny. Imposed as a probation
condition, the requirement of membership in a political advocacy
organization implicates fundamental First Amendment rights that
are insufficiently protected under either the reasonableness
standard27 2 or the balancing standard.
2 1
Assuming that an ideology-related condition of probation serves
the purposes of rehabilitation, 274 the reasonableness standard for
determining to what extent a probationer should be accorded
constitutional rights is inadequate to protect the right to be free
from compelled speech. The reasonableness test scrutinizes the
condition of probation in light of the offense, without any regard to
the importance of the constitutional right involved. Because a
sentence of Sierra Club membership is related to the offense of an
environmental crime, the probation condition withstands review
under the reasonableness test. When the constitutional right to be
free from government-imposed ideology, a "fixed star in our
constitutional constellation," 215 is at risk, however, the gravity of
the constitutional right must be considered.
The right to be free from compelled speech is also inadequately
protected by the balancing standard. The balancing test requires a
balancing between the government's interest in conditioning
probation and the probationer's liberty interest. While this test
might sometimes yield the proper protection for fundamental First
Amendment rights, because its application is very fact-specific, it
fails to guide sentencing courts in the use of their discretion.
Furthermore, the balancing test fails to consider whether the state's
interest in conditioning probation could be satisfied by less drastic
means. Thus, under the balancing standard, courts can still impose
restrictions on probationers that undermine our basic notions of
democracy and selfhood 276 and erect obstacles to full rehabilita-
is essential, not to issue authoritative statements but to encourage the process of self-
discovery").
27 See supra notes 118-31 and accompanying text.
273 See supra notes 132-48 and accompanying text.
274 This, however, might not be the case. See supra notes 220-21 and accompany-
ing text.
275 West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
276 See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
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Ideology-related probation conditions merit special scrutiny for
several reasons. First, they serve the goals of probation only
indirectly. Second, the extent to which they affect rehabilitation is
tenuous.278 Indeed, ideology-related probation conditions impede
rehabilitation, because the probationer is denied the fundamental
rights to self-respect and self-fulfillment, which are the basis of any
rehabilitative efforts. Most important, ideology-related conditions
of probation interfere with the "sphere of [the] intellect"279 and
unnecessarily intrude into realms that should be free from govern-
ment interference in our society.
Therefore, conditions of probation that compel speech,
expression, or association should be subjected to the least restrictive
alternative standard. Such conditions of probation should pass
constitutional scrutiny only if there is no more narrowly drawn
infringement that equally satisfies a state's interests in rehabilitation
and public safety. Under this standard, it is unlikely that any of the
ideology-related probation conditions discussed above would
withstand appellate review. For example, an offender could be
equally, if not better, educated in environmental issues by mandato-
ry attendance at an ideologically neutral education program.
28 0
Similarly, an offender convicted of driving under the influence can
undergo alcoholism counseling that does not contain religious
components.
281
Some critics of the least restrictive alternative standard allege
that this standard provides probationers the same level of constitu-
tional protection as nonprobationers. 282  Where fundamental
constitutional rights are concerned, however, an infringement
should be allowed only when necessary to meet a compelling state
interest. Indeed, the probationer is not off "scot-free": probation
conditions properly impose on the probationer a veritable laundry
See supra notes 265-71 and accompanying text.
27 See supra notes 220-21 and accompanying text.
279 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 706 (1977).
21 See supra notes 254-60 and accompanying text.
281 See Warner v. Orange County Dep't of Probation, 827 F. Supp. 261, 263
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting that there are alcohol abuse counselors acceptable to an
atheist); Christopher K. Smith, Note, State Compelled Spiritual Revelation: The First
Amendment and Alcoholics Anonymous as a Condition of Drunk Driving Probation, 1 WM.
& MARY BILL RTs.J. 299, 316 (1992) (noting that "[i]t would be possible for judges
or probation officers to create alternatives for those who reasonably object" to the
religious component of AA as a condition of probation).
28 See Bartrum, supra note 73, at 1045.
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list of duties and responsibilities. 28" Finally, the state's compelling
interests in rehabilitation and public safety adequately ensure a
distinction between permissible infringements of constitutional
rights of probationers and permissible infringements of constitution-
al rights of nonprobationers.
Ideology-related probation conditions aim to promote the
rehabilitation or reformation of the probationer through education.
Because education often encompasses ideological components,
however, these conditions should be scrutinized by the highest
constitutional standard. As shown by our expansive and successful
public education system, this country can educate its population
without indoctrinating it. Indeed, the best education infers the
existence of and encouragement of an ideological plurality.
CONCLUSION
Creative sentencing is a necessary component of the criminal
justice system in the latter part of Twentieth Century America.
Prison overcrowding and geometrically increasing public deficits
require that the judiciary be allowed to formulate alternatives to
traditional incarceration, particularly where there is little danger to
the community in doing so. Because trial judges are most familiar
with the facts of each case, they should maintain broad discretion
in determining conditions of probation.
An ideology-related condition of probation should be imposed,
however, only when the least restrictive alternative standard has
been satisfied. Application of this standard will reveal most
ideology-related probation conditions as unnecessarily restrictive.
Because of the unique nature of these probation conditions, the
importance for rehabilitation that the probationer learn to live
within societal norms, and the unique role of the right to be free
from government-compelled ideology, ideology-related probation
conditions merit this heightened constitutional scrutiny. After all,
"the strength of a constitutional system lies in the protection it
affords those who have trespassed."
284
" Examples of such duties include paying a fine, performing community service,
maintaining gainful employment, supporting legal dependents, participating in
alcohol or drug treatment, and submitting to regular unwarranted searches. See supra
notes 15, 41-42, 64 and accompanying text.
28 Hink, supra note 35, at 485.
